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ABSTRACT 
This paper aims to establish a cogent understanding of the relationship between judicial 
lawmaking and legitimacy of African Regional Economic Community Courts (RECs). It 
undertakes this by broadening that previous understanding of legitimacy of International 
comis, defined as "whose authority is perceived as justified." It asserts that previous 
conceptualization of legitimacy has impaired an appreciation of the necessity of judicial 
lawmaking in the development of human rights adjudication before the courts. 
The paper aims to lay down a theoretical underpinning for situations that necessitate the 
exercise of judicial lawmaking by an international court for the preservation of its 
legitimacy. It lays down a framework for identification of situations in which judicial 
lawmaking would enhance legitimacy. The first step is to establish whether the matter 
involves allegations of violations of core human rights obligator norms. If yes, then the 
exercise of judicial lawmaking to improve the procedural and substantive rules of the 
rule-interpreting institution will translate into preserving or enhancing its legitimacy. 
Where the IC ignores such issues its legitimacy is threatened. Where the matters do not 
involve violations of core human rights obligatory norms, any form of judicial lawmaking 
would likely lessen the comi' s legitimacy, as it would be espied to exercise authority that 
isn't its own. 
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I. JUDICIAL LEGITIMACY AND JUDICIAL LAWMAKING 
1.1. INTRODUCTION 
The bosom of the judiciary is not wide enough, for the hopes and aspirations of all the 
people; but it is an ample bosom, which seeks to respond to the problems presented to it, 
with a love of justice under the law. 
-Khanna J1 
This paper explores the relationship between judicial lawmaking and the legitimacy of 
regional economic community comts in light of their adjudication of human rights 
matters. The paper analyses three courts, namely, the ECOWAS Community Comt of 
Justice (ECCJY~ the East African Court of Justice (EACJ) and the Southern Africa 
Development Community Tribunal (SADC-T). To fmther substantiate the study, the 
paper looks at the International Comt of Justice (ICJ) and the decision by the Permanent 
Court of Arbitration (PCA) on the South China Sea dispute. 
1.1.1 Statement of the Problem 
The last decade has seen a rapid judicialisation of international law. 3 International courts 
now exercise a wide range of jurisdiction over diverse subjects. Africa has seen the 
institutionalisation of regional economic community comts. A similar mandate among 
these comts is the interpretation of the treaties that enabled them for the purpose of 
greater economic integration among the member states. These courts, have however, 
marshalled the authority to hear human rights claims, despite initial legislative 
resistance.4 The EACJ for example has proclaimed that it has jurisdiction to adjudicate on 
1M Kirby, 'Judicial activism,' Western Law Review, 27 (1997). 
2Alter K, Helfer L and McAllister J, 'A new international human rights court for West Africa: The 
ECOWAS community court of justice' 107, American Journal of International Law, (2013), 737-779. 
3 Helfer L and Alter K, in 'Legitimacy and lawmaking: A tale of three international couiis,' 14:479 
Theoretical Inquiries in Law, (20 13), 480. 
4 Ebobrah S, 'Litigating human rights before sub-regional courts in Africa: Prospects and challenges,' 17 
American Journal of International Law (2009) and Ojienda T, 'The East African Court of Justice in there-
established East Africa Community: Institutional structure and function in the integration process', 11 East 
2 
human rights5 despite of article 27(2) of the Treaty6, the ECCJ has engaged in bold 
adjudication of human rights and the SADC-Tribunal has experienced backlash as a result 
of its human rights adjudication. The unforeseen proliferation of judicial lawmaking 
practice by African REC courts necessitates a study into the seemingly putative link 
between judicial lawmaking and judicial legitimacy.7 This paper traces this link by first, 
positing a broader definition of legitimacy. It is against this understanding that the paper 
undertakes a study of the impact of REC courts' judicial lawmaking [in light of their 
human rights cases pronouncements] on their legitimacy. 
1.1.2 Justification of the study 
There is criticism that judicial lawmaking is set to deprive the court of its legitimacy. 8 
There is however another claim that judicial lawmaking is an inherent function of 
international courts. This is because, it concretises programs' (in the sense that it 
implements the normative project of a treaty), when it fills in legal gaps and when it 
solves contradictions.9 In light of these differing assertions, this paper aims to establish a 
cogent understanding of the relationship between judicial lawmaking and legitimacy of 
REC comis. 
It undertakes this by broadening that previOus understanding of legitimacy of 
International courts, defined as "whose authority is perceived asjustified." 10 It asserts that 
previous conceptualization of legitimacy has impaired an appreciation of the necessity of 
African journal of peace and human rights (2005) 220, 228. James Katabazi v. Secret my Gen. of the East 
African Community (East African Comt of Justice Nov. I, 2007). 
5 Democratic Party v Secret my General of the East African Community and four others (Appeal No.I of 
2014): Previously Reference No.2 of2013 . 
6 Article 27(2) EAC Treaty, 30111 November 1999 Gathii J, 'Mission creep or a search for relevance: The 
East African Comt of justice's human rights strategy ' 24 Duke Journal of Comparative and International 
Law, (2013) 249-296. 
7 Helfer L and Alter K, in 'Legitimacy and lawmaking: A tale of three international courts,' 14:479 
Theoretical Inquiries in Law, (20 13), 481. 
8 Helfer L and Alter K, in 'Legitimacy and lawmaking: A tale of three international courts,' 14:479 
Theoretical Inquiries in Law, (20 13), 488 citing Murungi L & Gallinetti J, 'The Role of Sub-Regional 
Comts in the African Human Rights System' 7 International Journal of Human rights (2010) 119,133 and 
Ebobrah S, 'Litigating human rights before sub-regional comts in Africa: Prospects and challenges,' /7 
American Journal of International Law (2009. 
9 BVerfG, Beschluss den Zweiten Senats vom 06. Juli 2010- 2BvR 2661106- Rn. (1-116). See also 
GrossmanN, 'The nonnative legitimacy of international courts' 86 Temple Law Review, (2013) 60-106. 
10 The above definition is from Grossman N, 'Legitimacy and international adjudicative bodies,' 41 
George.Washington International Law Review (2009), 107, 110 where she cites Bodansky D, 'The 
legitimacy of international governance: A coming challenge for international environmental law?' 93 
American Journal of International law ( 1999), 596- 600. 
judicial lawmaking in the preservation of judicial legitimacy. This is especially so, in 
light of the increasing adjudication of human rights matters in ICs such as African REC 
courts. The paper aims to lay down a theoretical framework for situations that necessitate 
the exercise of judicial lawmaking by a court for the preservation of its legitimacy. It 
asserts that where the violation of a peremptory human rights norm is in question, judicial 
lawmaking to expand the substantive and procedural rules of a comt is necessary to 
ensme its legitimacy. This is because legitimacy dictates that an IC; other than exercising 
authority perceived as justified, also complies with the fundamental normative principles 
underlying international law. To do otherwise, would be to compromise the court's 
legitimacy. 
1.2. A THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK OF THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN 
JUDICIAL LEGITIMACY AND JUDICIAL LAWMAKING 
1.2.1 Legitimacy in Law: A Municipal Concept 
Rudiger Wolfrum engages in an expository analysis of the growmg interest m the 
legitimacy of international law. 11 He bases his analysis on the agreed upon definition of 
legitimacy as "authority whose exercise is justified. 12 The particular branch of legitimacy 
he studies is nonnative legitimacy. Grossman explains the reason for fascination with this 
particular branch of legitimacy. 13 She provides two reasons why the study of the 
normative legitimacy of the international legal order is crucial. One is that it provides a 
standard by which to judge an international comt and determine whether it merits 
support. 14 Second, is that it determines what qualities provide international comts with the 
right to rule or what justifies their authority. 15 This paper, in the same vein, examines the 
concept of nonnative legitimacy of international comts to find the effect of judicial 
lawmaking on it. 
11 Wolfrum R, Legitimacy in international law from a legal perspective: Some introductmy considerations 
in Wolfrum R and Roben Volker (eds), Legitimacy in international institutions Max-Planck Institut fur 
auslandisches offentliches Recht und Volkrecht, 2008. 
12 Wolfrum R, Legitimacy in international law ji·om a legal perspective: Some introductmy considerations, 
1-25. 
13 GrossmanN, 'The normative legitimacy of international courts' Temple Law Review, 64. 
14 GrossmanN, 'The normative legitimacy of international courts' Temple Law Review, 64. 
15 GrossmanN, 'The normative legitimacy of international comts ' Temple Law Review, 60-103 . 
4 
Traditionally, international law has been defined as a body of rules and obligations.16 
These rules and obligations are to be obeyed; indeed, any legal system is founded on the 
premise of compliance. 17 Compliance has dominated analyses by legal theorists 
concerned with municipal law. 18 Austin, in his descriptive theory of law, was unable to 
reconcile the idea of law with a system that lacked an enforcement mechanism. 19 His 
theory propounded the existence of law in a society that had a sovereign: operating 
outside the law, who issued commands backed by sanctions to subdued subjects that 
habitually obeyed him. For Austin, law could only exist within such parameters.20 Any 
form of rule existing outside the prescribed confines was only a watered-down version of 
law. Coercion hence, was the sole reason he isolated to justify compliance with municipal 
law. Coercion did not only enable compliance, it also validated and coalesced the coerced 
rule, into law.21 
However, there is more that engenders compliance to a rule or institution than just 
coercion enabled by well-developed enforcement mechanisms.22Another factor that 
engenders compliance is peoples' normative inclinations to obey a ce1tain rule or rule 
making institution.23 This constituted Brut's rebuff of the Austinian theory.24 Hart's 
acceptance that there were more factors that enabled compliance other than coercion 
rejuvenated an age-old debate between positivists and neo-naturalists as to what really 
enabled fidelity to law.25 It was understood that these non-coercive elements that induced 
compliance, constituted the legitimacy of the rule or the rule making institution.26 
Legitimacy was hence defined as that prope1ty of a rule or a rule making institution which 
itself exerts a pull towards compliance on those addressed normatively because those 
16 Franck M T, The power of legitimacy among nations 3-27. 
17 Franck M T, The power of legitimacy among nations Oxford University Press, 1990, 3-27. 
18 Franck M T, The power of legitimacy among nations Oxford University Press, 1990, 16. 
19 Austin J, The province ofjurisprudence determined, London: John Murray, Albermarble Street, 1832, 9-
"" .).). 
20 Austin J, Province ofjurisprudence determined 9-33. Austin viewed commands issued by a superior with 
the coupling of coercive power- the enforcer of obedience as 'inseparably connected' elements of law and 
therefore dismissed international law as mere 'positive morality. 
21 Franck M T, The power of legitimacy among nations, 15. 
22 Franck M T, The power of legitimacy among nations, 3-26. 
23 Franck M T, The power of legitimacy among nations, 3-26. 
24 Hart, Concept oflaw, 2ed Clarendon Law Series (1961), 18-20. 
25 Fuller L, 'Positivism and fidelity to law: A reply to Professor Hmt', 71 Harvard Law Review ( 1958) 630-
672. 
26 Franck M T, The power of legitimacy among nations, 3-26. 
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addressed believe that the rule or institution has come into being and operates m 
accordance with generally accepted principles of right process.27 
It was empirically difficult to asce1tain the non-coercive, compliance-inducing factors in 
municipal systems.28 The inseparability of the coercive and non-coercive compliance-
inducing elements made it difficult, if not improbable, to determine the composition, 
nature, strength and measure of the non-coercive compliance inducing factors. 29 The 
study of legitimacy was hence stunted. International law offers a chance unlike that 
advanced by municipal law.30 The stunted development of its own enforcement enabling 
mechanism to ensure coercive compliance has occasioned many to find it unbecoming of 
a true legal system. 31 However, as noted by Thomas Franck, its want of coercive, 
compliance-inducing factors leaves compliance solely enabled by non-coercive 
compliance-inducing elements. As non-coercive compliance inducing factors are 
essentially the legitimacy of the rule or rule making institution, this means that legitimacy 
in the international legal order exists in an unalloyed, empirically discernible state.32 This 
has hence made the international legal system a peculiar but most enlightening avenue to 
engage in a study of legitimacy as an independent variable. 
1.2.2 Legitimacy in the International Judicial Order and State Backlash as its 
validating cue 
Despite the umque avenue afforded by the international legal order, legitimacy as a 
concept is still under developed. 33 An incorrigible set of fundamental principles of 
international law have tethered inextricably and halted the development of legitimacy as a 
concept. 34 One of these principles is the overriding principle of state consent. 35 The 
international legal order is understood as a constituency of states.36 Much of international 
law developed as either express or implied agreements among states.37 Consequently, 
27 Franck M T, The power of legitimacy among nations, 3-26. 
28 Hart, Concept of law, 2ed Clarendon Law Series ( 1961 ), 18-20 
29 Franck M T, The power of legitimacy among nations, 24. 
30 Hart, Concept of law, 220-227. 
31 Hmt H, Concept oflaw (1961), Austin J, Province ofjurisprudence determined, 213-232. 
32 Franck M T, The power of legitimacy among nations, 26. 
33 Franck M T, The power of legitimacy among nations, 16. 
34 Franck M T, The power of legitimacy among nations, 183-195. 
35 Franck M T, The power of legitimacy among nations, 183-195. 
36 Hart, Concept of law, 220-227. 
37 Hart, Concept of law, 220-227. 
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state consent as the most fundamental skein in validating a law or rule in the international 
legal order was and has been an accepted claim.38 Legitimacy, in international law, has 
hence been understood to mean that which is accepted and employed by states. 39 
It hence seems to be the sole prerogative of States to craft signals to communicate when a 
rule or a rule making institution loses or gains legitimacy. 40 This is done through 
validating cues. Essentially, these conununicate the validity and authenticity of a rule or a 
rule-maker.41 This communication is one way of establishing the legitimacy of a rule or a 
rule-making institution.42 Cues that are able to communicate validity of a rule or a rule-
maker are true cues. Those that are unable to communicate validity are false cues.43 
Focussing on international courts as rule-making institutions, one such cue signifying the 
lack of legitimacy of an international court or a ruling by an international court could be 
state coordinated backlash.44 Backlash entails a reaction against a court, ranging from 
cursory negative remarks to synchronized efforts to halt and reconfigure the court.45 
Where successful, the comi's authority is effectively cmiailed.46 One could hence assume 
that a backlash reifies loss of an international court' s judiciallegitimacy_47 It is this so1i of 
understanding that has informed IC scholars, while analysing legitimacy in international 
comis.48 The question however, is whether this has been and still remains a true cue.49 
Thomas Franck defines true cues by defining false cues.50 A false cue, he says, constitutes 
cognitive dissonance between what is and what is being communicated or validated.51 
38 Hart, Concept of law, 220-227. 
39 Hmt, Concept of law, 220-227. 
4° Franck M T, The power of legitimacy among nations, 91-135. 
4 1 Franck M T, The power of legitimacy among nations, 91. 
42 Franck M T, The power of legitimacy among nations, 9 I. 
43 Franck M T, The power of legitimacy among nations, I 34. 
44 Interview with Mbori H on 16th December2016. 
45 Interview with Mbori H on I 6th December 20 I 6. 
46 Interview with Mbori H on I 6th December 20 I 6. 
47 Interview with Mbori H on I 6th December 2016. 
48 Interview with Mbori H on I 6th December 2016. See also Helfer L and Alter K, in ' Legitimacy and 
lawmaking: A tale of three international courts' , 479-504. 
49 Franck M T, The power of legitimacy among nations, 111-135. 
50 "Consider a Serbian admiral in a navy garb. As a cue, this is supposed to communicate that he or she is 
an official, representative of a state ' s territorial sovereignty, hence validating the uniform used as a symbol 
of the State. However, despite the cue, Serbia is a land-locked country hence in no need of a national navy. 
The cue is a false cue". In Franck M, 'The power of legitimacy among nations' Oxford University Press, 
Madison New York, 1990, Ill . 
51 Franck M T, ' The power of legitimacy among nations' 134. 
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This diminishes the potency of the cue in its ability to validate or legitimise. It is hence 
important to ascertain whether state backlash to ICs is a true cue or a false cue. 
1.2.2.1 A Jurisprudential Examination of the Veracity of the Concept of State 
Consent as the Bedrock of Legitimacy in the International Legal Order 
The reason advanced in support of backlash as a true cue of an international institution's 
loss of legitimacy is grounded in ·the underlying principle of state consent as the 
foundation of the international legal order. 52 Essentially in international law, a legitimate 
function is understood as that which has been consented to by states.53 Consequently, 
legitimacy is validated and invalidated by a state, against or for itself.54 The question 
hence is whether the inviolable concept of state consent is truly the foundation of an 
international polity, making state backlash to an international institution a true cue to its 
loss of legitimacy. To examine whether state consent is truly the foundation of today's 
international legal order demands a study of theories of legal development. 
1.2.2.1.1 Hart on the Centrality of State Consent as the legitimising factor in 
International law and The Normative Hierarchy of Rules 
HLA Hart's expository analysis of the development of legal orders led him to conclude 
that the international system consists of a primitive form of organisation; a simple social 
structure.55 This was because the only tool that engendered compliance to the rules was 
consent of the parties involved. 56 Compared to societies organised similarly to those in 
state of nature, this form of organisation was deemed to be only capable of yielding 
primary rules of obligation.57 These are mere ad hoc reciprocal agreements between 
parties.58 The organisation lacked secondary rules, which reinforce primary rules by 
52 Hart, Concept of law, 220-227. 
53 Hart, Concept of law, 220-227. 
54 Hart, Concept of law, 220-227. 
55 "In form, international law resembles such a regime of primary rules, even though the content of its often 
elaborate rules are very unlike those of a primitive society, and many of its concepts, methods and 
techniques are the same as those of municipal law". Ha1t, Concept of law, 227. 
56 "The rules of the simple structure are, like the basic rule of the more advanced systems, binding if they 
are accepted and function as such ... " Hart, Concept of law, 227, See also Hart, Concept of law, 235 and 
Franck M T, The power of legitimacy among nations, 183. 
57 Hart, Concept of law, 220-227. 
58 Hart, Concept of law, 227 and Franck M T, The power of legitimacy among nations, 184. 
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defining the rule-system's right process.59 While pnmary rules constitute a system' s 
workhorse, secondary rules provide an infrastructure that defines how rules are to be 
made, interpreted and applied.60 Secondary rules validate primary rules, in a framework 
of normative hierarchy.61 The absence of a normative hierarchy consequently precludes 
validation of primary rules by anything other than reciprocal agreements between the 
parties.62 
According to Hart, the international legal system lacked crucial secondary rules, which 
permit an evolution and adaptation of rules through legislation and decisions by courts.63 
The lack of secondary rules only enabled a source of primary rules, which exist in the 
simplest forms as reciprocal alTangements, such as contracts or treaties.64 These ad hoc 
reciprocal arrangements, whose validation comes from the consent of parties, were to 
Hmi, incapable of wielding a strong obligatory compliance pull as is done by rules, which 
are made within a framework of organised normative hierarchy.65 
Hati's contribution is not devoid of its own incoherencies.66 While noting that state 
consent is manifested by reliance on treaties as primary sources of law, he found the 
argument that treaties are binding because states have consented to them to be 
fallacious .67 He wrote that the view that states may impose on themselves obligations by 
promise, agreement or treaty is not consistent with the view that states are subject only to 
rules that they have imposed upon themselves essentially doubting his own alleged 
primitiveness of the international legal order.68 Hart' s theory being a descriptive one, it 
was limited to the time in which the observation was made. It is discountable that the 
international system has remained averse to the development of secondary rules of 
recognition.69 There are rules in international law that exhibit strong compliance pulls. 
59 Hart, Concept of law, 227 and Franck M T, The power of legitimacy among nations, I 84. 
6° Franck M T, The power of legitimacy among nations, I 84. 
61 Hm1, Concept of law, 220-227 and Franck M T, The power of legitimacy among nations, I 83- I 84. 
62 Hm1, Concept of law, 220-227 and Franck M T, The power of legitimacy among nations, I 83- I 84. 
63 Hm1, Concept of law, 220-227 and Franck M T, The power of legitimacy among nations, 183-184. 
64 Hart, Concept of law, 220- 227 and Franck M T, The power of legitimacy among nations, I 83- I 84. 
65 Hart, Concept of law, 220-227 and Franck M T, The power of legitimacy among nations, I 83- I 84 
66 Franck M T, The power of legitimacy among nations, I 87. 
67 Hart, Concept of law, 224. 
68 " ••• First, these theories fail completely to explain how it is known that states 'can' only be bound by self-
imposed obligations, or why this view of their sovereignty should be accepted, in advance of any 
examination of the actual character of international law. Is there anything more to support it besides the fact 
that it has often been repeated?" Hart, Concept of law, 224. 
69 Franck M T, The power of legitilnacy among nations, I 86. 
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Examples include the rule on non-intervention, the 'Most Favoured Nation' principle and 
the rules on diplomatic relations among others.70 The ingenuity of his contribution though, 
was the identification of an evolutionary and hierarchical process in legal development. 71 
Treaties, which could be said to be formal sources enabling the state-consent principle, 
are synonymous to contracts in municipal systems. 72 Contracts are not binding because 
the parties to the contract have agreed to them. Neither are treaties binding because, as 
noted by Hmi, the contracting States have agreed to be bound. 73 Both treaties and 
contracts are binding because the law has proscribed and defined the requirements of a 
valid commitment and if those are met, it is the law that imposes a binding obligation on 
the pmiies.74 The law in essence, validates itself.75 The normative rules on the creation, 
interpretation and application of either contracts or treaties are secondary rules of 
recognition, which in turn validate the contract or the treaty agreed upon. 76 
The certain kind of evolutionary stage that the international legal order has attained is 
devoid of any appellation. 77 However, a study of the simplest rules in the international 
order reveals a development of both primary and secondary rules of obligation.78 
Consider as an example the existence of treaties. These are in themselves, primary rules 
of obligation between consenting pmiies.79 However, there exists in addition, rules about 
treaties such as pacta sunt servanda (treaties are binding). 80 It is this rule that has enabled 
the evolution and adaptation of treaty law through legislation and interpretation by comis 
while validating the treaties that parties consent to. 81 This is evidence of an existing 
secondary rule of recognition in the intemationallegal order. 82 
7° Franck M T, The power of legitimacy among nations, 187. 
71 Franck M T, The power of legitimacy among nations, 187. 
72 Reservations Cases (Reservations to the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of 
Genocide), Advisory Opinion, ICJ Rep01ts, I 951. See Franck M T, The power of legitimacy among nations, 
187. 
73 " ••. • pacta sunt servanda has however been abandoned by most theorists since it seems incompatible with 
the fact that not all obligations under international law arise from 'pacta"' Hart, Concept oflcnv, 224. 
74 Franck M T, The power of legitimacy among nations, 187. 
75 Franck M T, The power of legitimacy among nations, 187. 
76 Franck M T, The power of legitimacy among nations, 187. 
77 Franck M T, The power of legitimacy among nations, 187. 
78 Franck M T, The power of legitimacy among nations, 187. 
79 Franck M T, The po·wer of legitimacy among nations, 187. 
80 Article 26, Vienna convention on the law of treaties, 23 May 1969, 1155 UNTS 331. 
81 Sinclair I, The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, 2"d ed Manchester University Press, 1984. 
82 Franck M T, The power of legitimacy among nations, 187. 
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Examining the rule pacta sunt servanda, it evindences the existence of higher norms, 
known as ultimate rules of recognition.83 The rule pacta sunt servanda does not derive its 
binding force solely from the agreement of the pmties.84 Its binding force must come 
from an unwritten rule of recognition, the existence of which is infen·ed from the conduct 
and belief (opinio juris) of states.85 To illustrate, consider the limitations on the principle 
of consent as regards treaties entered into between States. In the negotiations leading to 
article 26 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT), an amendment to the 
text of article 23 as it was then, specified that a treaty even though declared by its parties 
as binding between them, remained invalid if it was contrary to the fundamental 
principles of internationallaw.86 The principle is now codified by mticle 53, 64 and 71 of 
the VCLT.87 The fundamental principles of international law override any consensual 
undertaking between parties; whose purpose, derogates from them. These principles 
constitute unwritten rules of obligation for states.88 
An observation of state practice reveals that nations act based on the understanding that 
when they enter into agreements they have a duty to comply. 89 This obligation is superior 
to the states' sovereign will and continues until the agreement is amended or terminated 
in strict compliance with its requirements. 90 Ultimate rules of recognition validate the 
secondary and primary rules of recognition but they themselves, are not possibly 
validated by any other rule.91 
83 "Sovereignty, in the international community, thus resides in a set of principles of universal application, 
such as those pertaining to the binding nature of treaties and of custom. These ultimate rules of recognition 
are sovereign in the sense that, while they are not coercively enforced, they are known to obligate (and also 
entitle) all states, with or without their specific consent" Franck M T, The power of legitimacy among 
nations, I 92. 
84 Franck M T, The power of legitimacy among nations, 188. 
85 Franck M T, The power of legitimacy among nations, I 88. 
86 "A treaty did not become valid merely because the parties had brought it into force and had declared it to 
be binding between them ; that view had been expressed by Hyde. The treaty would come into operation, 
but would not be valid if it was contrary to the fundamental principles of international law." Official 
Records of the United Nations Conference on the Law of Treaties, First Session A/CONF.39/C. l /SR.29 26 
March- 24 May 1968, 152. See the orig inal five states ' amendment (A/CONF.39/C.I/L.I 18). 
87 Article 53 , 64 and 71 , Vienna convention on the lmv of treaties. 
88 Franck M T, The power of legitimacy among nations, 188. 
890fficial Records of the United Nations Conference on the Law of Treaties, First Session 
A/CONF.39/C.I /SR.29 26 March - 24 May I968, I52. See the original five states' amendment 
(A/CONF.39/C.I/ L.I I 8). See also Franck M T, The power of legitimacy among nations, I 88. 
9° Franck M T, The power of legitimacy among nations, 188. 
9 1 Hart, Concept of lmv, II 0-1 I 7. See also, Franck M T, The power of legitimacy among nations, 188. 
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The compliance pull exerted by secondary and ultimate rules of recognition is much 
greater than that exeried by primary rules of obligation.92 One can much easily justify 
abrogation from the text of a treaty than from the underlying principle of pacta sunt 
servanda.93 Existing independently of a state's sovereign will, these general principles of 
obligations were once explained as obligations deriving their status from natural/neo-
natural law which towered over a state's sovereign wilJ.94 Following the desuetude of the 
natural law principles, the resulting vault was incorrectly filled by the principle of state 
consent: an incorrect exposition of the nature of the international legal order. 95 This 
inadveriently prevented a study into the evolving nature of international law by keeping it 
incorrectly affixed to a primitive consensual status while it had in fact mutated.96 
1.2.2.1.2 Dworkin's Associative Obligations, Community and Legitimacy 
General principles of obligation engender compliance, not as a result of consent but rather, 
as a result of status in the international legal order.97 The concept of ' obligating status' is 
analysed by Dworkin. He finds that in a community, there are general principles of 
obligation or "associative" obligations, which define what each member owes to the 
others.98 The absence of community precludes the formation and development of 
associative obligations. 99 Consequently, the existence of these in the international 
system100 if proven, would demonstrate the existence of an international community: a 
divisive subject among international legal theorists.101 Consider for example, the rule on 
non-intervention. "States are obligated to abstain from the threat or use of force against 
92 Franck M T, The power of legitimacy among nations, 186. 
93 Franck M T, The power of legitimacy among nations, 186. 
94 Franck citing Suarez F, A treatise on laws and God the law giver, Knud Hakonssen, ( 1612) See Franck M 
T, The power of legitimacy among nations, 188. · 
95 Franck citing Suarez F, A treatise on laws and God the law giver, Knud Hakonssen, (1612). 
96 See Franck M T, The power of legitimacy among nations, 188. 
97 Franck M T, The po·wer of legitimacy among nations 195-208. 
98Dworkin R, Law 's Empire Harvard University Press, Cambridge, 1986, 176-225. 
99 Dworkin R, Law's Empire, 176-225. See also, Franck M T, ' The power of legitimacy among nations' 
195-208. 
100 "Charles Hermann states, "A system is a set of actors (for example, nations, international organizations, 
and so on) interacting with one another in established patterns and through designated structures." Franck 
M T, The power of legitimacy among nations 199. 
101 "Hart, publishing in 1961, would probably have been skeptical that the international system had evolved 
into what we have called a "community"-a term he does not employ-because he was unable to detect 
convincing examples of secondary rules of recognition, let alone an ultimate rule of recognition." Franck M 
T, The power of legitimacy among nations 20 I. See also Haass R, 'What international community' Project 
Syndicate, 27 March 20 17-https://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/the-broken-tools-of-global-
cooperation-by-richard-n--haass?barrier=accessreg on 271h March 2017. 
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the territorial integrity or political independence of any State ... " 102 This obligation is owed 
generally to all members and accrues to each member by virtue of their status as a State in 
international law and not by their consent or lack thereof. 103 The only way such an 
obligation can be extinguished is not tlu·ough revocation of consent, but rather through a 
revocation of status, in this case, statehood status.104 
In an Advisory Opinion following the US Congress' enactment of a law requiring the 
closure of the Observer Mission of the Palestine Liberation Organisation, ICJ judges 
unanimously agreed that there are obligations, which derive their pull to compliance not 
from specific consent but from membership in cornmunity.105 In the words of Judge 
Stephen M Schwebel, "the sovereign will of states is dwarfed or subordinated to 
obligations that derive from the state's status as a member of the comrnunity." 106 Judge H 
Mosler further asserted, "States are subject to these norms, by their status rather than by 
consent to the requisite public order. Public order," he continues, "consists of principles 
and rules, the enforcement of which is of such vital importance to the international 
community as a whole that any unilateral action that contravenes these principles can 
have no legal effect." 107 
Membership in the international community demands that states relinquish the idea of 
'absolute sovereignty' as a result of their statehood. 108 Hence, sovereignty in international 
law resides in a set of principles of universal application such as those pe1iaining to 
custom or those on the binding nature of treaties evident in the practice of the 
102 Article 2(4), Charter of the United Nations, 26th June 1945, I UNTS XVI. 
103 See UNGA, Declaration on Principles of International Law concerning Friendly Relations and Co-
operation among States in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, UN A/Res/25/2625, 24th 
October 1970. 
104 In this case, the pull to obligation, is much akin to that exerted by medieval law, by reference to divine 
law which exists out of temporal context, has not been made and can not be validated by reference to 
another, but is binding indirectly as a result of its being subsumed in "made" laws. Dworkin R, Law's 
Empire, 208. 
105 Applicability of the obligation to arbitrate under section 21 of the United Nations Headquarters 
agreement of26'" June 1947, Advisory Opinion, ICJ Reports, 1988, 12. 
106 Applicability of the obligation to arbitrate under section 21 of the United Nations Headquarters 
agreement of26'" June 1947, Advisory Opinion, ICJ Reports, 1988, Separate Opinion of Judge Schwebel, 
107 H. Mosler, The International Society as Legal Community, Sijthoff & Noordhoff International 
Publishers, Alphen aan den Rijn, The Netherlands, 1980, 19-20. 
108 Franck M T, The power of legitimacy among nations, 192. 
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community. 109 It is these ultimate rules of recognition that are sovereign as, while not 
coercively enforced; they obligate and also entitle States without their specific consent. 110 
1.2.2.1.3 Reconciling Legitimacy and the Principle of Sovereign International 
Community Principles 
This section began by stating that legitimacy in the international order has been 
understood as deriving from that which States consent to. Backlash as a cue signifYing the 
illegitimacy of a rule or a rule making institution has hence been accepted as a true cue of 
the loss of legitimacy. However, the analysis above reveals that State consent is not the 
underlying foundation of the international legal order. The legitimacy of the rules in 
primitive societies is derived from consent of the parties involved. If the international 
order were a primitive society, then rules would obligate as a result of the consent of its 
members. The international order, however, does not constitute a primitive society as can 
be seen by the presence of associative obligations. It is instead, a community and rules in 
a mature voluntarist conmmnity, do not only obligate as a result of the consent of its 
members but also, as a concomitant of the status of membership. 111 
In a mature voluntarist community such as the international community, the legitimacy of 
its rules and rule-making institutions is validated by their adherence to the existing rule-
hierarchy.112 This is because, the rules and rule-making institutions are deemed to be 
legitimate if they adhere to a validating normative structure. 113 Primary rules such as 
treaties are considered legitimate if validated by secondary rules of recognition such as 
the rule pacta sunt servanda. 114 These secondary rules are deemed legitimate if validated 
by the ultimate rules of recognition. 115 The legitimacy of a primary rule could be 
demonstrated by showing that it adheres to the rules of right process that are outlined in 
the secondary rules.116 The legitimacy of secondary rules could be demonstrated by 
specific or implied consent of states. 117 However, the legitimacy of the ultimate rules 
109 Franck M T, The power of legitimacy among nations, 192. 
11° Franck M T, The power of legitimacy among nations, 192. 
111 Dworkin R, Law's Empire, 176-225 and Franck M T, The power of legitimacy among nations 194. 
112 Dworkin R, Law's Empire, 176-225 and Franck M T, The power of legitimacy among nations 194. 
113 Dworkin R, Law 's Empire, 176-225 and Franck M T, The power of legitimacy among nations 194. 
114 Franck M T, The power of legitimacy among nations 194. 
115 Franck M T, The power of legitimacy among nations 194. 
116 Franck M T, The power of legitimacy among nations 194. 
117 Franck M T, The power of legitimacy among nations 194. 
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could only be inferred from the conduct of states and not from other validating rules or 
procedures. It can only be inferred from the nature of the system as a community of 
states. 118 Consequently, backlash; a cue signifying the lack of state consent does not 
constitute an inviolable true cue to the loss of legitimacy of a rule or a rule-making 
institution. This is because; states consent is not an undisputable determinant of the 
legitimacy of a rule or rule-making institution. The subsequent sections demonstrate this 
further by focussing on the role of the principles of justice and international human rights 
law in determining normative legitimacy. 
1.2.3 Legitimacy, Justice and International Human Rights Law 
Thomas Franck devotes the last chapter of his book to examine justice and legitimacy. He 
identifies them as two distinct concepts, each creating a compliance pull. 119 However, the 
two concepts never conflate. The reason is because, as justice is associated with 
individuals, it is considered futile to examine justice's compliance pull in an international 
legal sphere, whose subject is states. However, Thomas Franck foreshadowed the rise of 
international human rights as a basic concept .of global politics and warned that such 
happenstance would require a re-evaluation of justice and legitimacy in international 
law. 120 The latter half of this section evaluates this in the light of a human rights 
dominated global space. 
1.2.3.1 Principles of Justice in the International Legal Order 
The Rawlsian attempt to identify principles of justice in the international legal order 
demonstrates why justice is an individual's concept that cannot be achieved by entities. 121 
Rawls puts equal states behind a veil of ignorance just as he does for the municipal legal 
118 "There are important differences in the degree or extent to which obligations arise in a developed 
national legal system and in the fledgling international community. But it is also demonstrable that there are 
obligations owed by states, which they widely recognize as concomitants of community membership and 
which are accurate predictors of actual state behavior. There are rules which obligate not because they have 
been accepted by the individual sovereign state but because they come with membership in the community 
of peers." Frank M T, The power of legitimacy among nations, 192. 
119 "There are two reasons for not including justice among the factors making for legitimacy. One is 
operational, the other theoretical. The operational reason is that justice can only be said to be done to 
persons, not to such collective entities as states. The second, or theoretical, reason for refusing to include 
justice among the indicators of a rule's legitimacy is that the concepts of justice and legitimacy are related 
but conceptually distinct." Franck M T, The power of legitimacy among nations, 209. 
120 "As the firm outlines of world order become readily apparent, and as that order increasingly focuses on 
the individual's place in global society, a keener understanding of the theory, function , and power of justice 
must surely move to the top of the agenda" Franck M T, The power of legitimacy among nations, 257. 
121 Franck M T, The power of legitimacy among nations 208-246. 
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theory. 122 This is done in a situation of moderate scarcity making it virtually impossible 
for the states to achieve their conceptions of good. 123 The result, Rawls opines, is that 
states would come up with principles of justice governing their interactions in an 
international conununity. 124 The principles that were identified by Rawls were those of 
self-determination and non-intervention. 125 He understood them to be principles of justice 
capable of being arrived at behind the (states') veil of ignorance. 126 The principle of self-
determination, though agreeably just, has fallen into desuetude tlu·ough its inconsistent 
application by states. 127 The principle of non-intervention on the other hand, preserves the 
authority of states and at times, demands that states fail to intervene in situations of gross 
domestic injustice. 128 
Rawlsian principles illustrate that states even behind the Rawlsian veil of ignorance, 
would come up, not with principles of justice, but rather, with principles guarding their 
self-interest: especially, their sovereignty .129 Indeed, there were demonstrations of 
conflict between principles of justice and fundamental principles protecting state-
interest.130 The periodic and selective interpretation of atiicle 1 of the UN Charter 
illustrates this. The generally just principle of self-determination, once fiercely advocated 
for by colonised states in pursuance of their emancipation, is now rarely accepted by the 
122 Rawls J, A theory ofjustice, Harvard University Press, Cambridge Massachusetts, 1947, 331-335. 
123 "I assume that these representatives are deprived of various kinds of information. While they know that 
they represent different nations each living under the normal circumstances of human life, they know 
nothing about the particular circumstances of their own society, its power and strength in comparison with 
other nations, nor do they know their place in their own society." Rawls J, A themy ofjustice, 331 . 
124"This original position is fair between nations; it nullifies the contingencies and biases of historical fate . 
Justice between states is determined by the principles that would be chosen in the original position so 
interpreted. These principles are political principles, for they govern public policies toward other nations." 
Rawls J, A themy ofjustice, 332. 
125 Rawls identifies three principles that would be agreed upon by states under the veil of ignorance. These 
are the principle of self-determination, the principle of self-defence (A11icle 51 of UN Chartter) and the 
principle that treaties are binding. These however, would be done under the umbrella principle of equality 
of parties. Rawls J, A themy ofjustice, 332. 
126 Rawls J, A themy ofjustice, 332. 
127 There have been inconsistent applications of the principle of self-determination by states. European 
states employed it in the early 20'" century such as in the case of the Danes of Schleswig, Czech, Alsace-
Lorraine Aaland and others but not to colonial states in Africa. Following independence of the colonised 
states, the principle fell into desuetude in African states for the minority nations enclosed within the 
liberated borders. For fut1her analysis of the principle of self-determination, see Franck M T, The power of 
legitimacy among nations, 150-183 . 
128 "Applying such a principle as a principle of justice, justice would have been served when the world left 
Hitler free to kill the Jews of Germany and Field Marshal ldi Amin and Pol Pot free to decimate the 
populations of Uganda and Cambodia." See Franck M T, The power of legitimacy among nations, 150-183. 
129 Franck M T, The power of legitimacy among nations, 150-183 
13° Franck M T, The power of legitimacy among nations, 208-24 7. 
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same states for minorities m their jurisdictions. 131 Instead, the principle of territorial 
integrity is advanced to quell calls for the right to self-determination.132 Thomas Franck 
understood that justice, as a concept, could not be broached except where individuals are 
concerned.133 It would hence only gain importance in the international sphere, when 
individuals truly became subjects of internationallaw. 134 This would probably be done, he 
propounded, through the globalisation of human rights law.135 
1.2.3.2 Increasingly Identifiable State Associative Obligations from 
International Human Rights Law: Finding Justice in Legitimacy 
Stefan Hoffman, a human rights legal historian, propounds that human rights became a 
basic concept of global politics in the 1990s. 136 As the ideas subsumed into the 
international legal order, human rights principles brought to fore a greater understanding 
of norms and principles of justice that formed part of the body of secondary and ultimate 
rules of recognition of international law.137 These principles clarified on existing ultimate 
------- --~-- --
131 "Consider India, which became independent as the world's largest example of voluntary compliance (by 
Britain) with the principle of self-determination but which thereupon used its armed forces, first, to deny 
self-determination to the state of Kashmir, which had a rather persuasive claim based on ethnic, religious, 
and legal grounds, and, later, to occupy Goa. The second example is Nigeria, the most populous African 
state, which, after being granted self-determination by Britain, thereafter denied it to its ethnically and 
rel igiously distinct lbo region (Biafra). In this Nigeria received both global and regional support. Only four 
African states, and one non-African, recognized Biafra's independence." See Franck M T, The power of 
legitimacy among nations, 163 . 
132 Marxsen C, ' Territorial integrity in international law - Its concept and implications for Crimea,' 75, 
Zeitschrift fiir duslandisches offentliches Recht und Volkerrecht, Heidelberg Journal of International Law, 
2015,7-26. 
133 "Since one can only talk metaphorically of justice among states, it is difficult to say anything meaningful 
or true about the justice of the international rule system. At its present stage of development, most systemic 
rules command not persons but states, allocating duties and benefits on an aggregate basis. To say that the 
rules operate justly among nations, however, is to say little about the rules' actual impact on those who 
matter: the individuals who, unlike states, are capable of pleasure and pain. That this is an inevitable barrier 
to assessing the justice of the international rule system, however, does not affect our abi lity to measure 
quite accurately and usefully the legitimacy of those rules ... " Franck M T, The power of legitimacy among 
nations, 219. 
134 Franck M T, The power of legitimacy among nations, 208-247. 
135 Franck M T, The power of legitimacy among nations, 208-247. 
136 Ludwig S, citing Stefan Hoffman in, Human rights and history past and present, Oxford online journals, 
Ludwig affirms Samuel Moyn's assertions that human rights idealism propounded in the 1990s represented 
a strange return of earlier enthusiasms for: cosmopolitanism, civil society, free trade and humanitarian 
intervention. Moyn S, The last utopia, Belknap Press of Harvard University, 2010, 176. See also, Koselleck 
R, Futures Past: On the sacredness of the person or the last utopia: A conversation about a hist01y of 
human rights' semantics of historical times, Cambridge Massachusetts, 1985, and Hmtog F, Regimes of 
historicity: Present ism and experiences of time, Columbia University Press, New York, 2015. 
137 Bianchi A, 'Human rights and the magic ofjus cogens' 19 European Journal of International Law, 491 -
508. 
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rules of recognition underlying the body of the international legal order. 138 Writing in 
1966, Judge Tanaka dissenting from the majority opinion in the South West Africa case 
recognised that certain human rights principles were understood to belong to a category 
of law, Ous co gens), which, differentiated from jus disposivitum, could not be changed by 
way of agreement between States.139 Recognising various human rights principles as 
peremptory or jus co gens norms, (a body of secondary and ultimate rules of recognition), 
the obligations owed by states to preserve and respect these norms, were obligations erga 
omnes. 140 
Human rights principles developed to shelter individuals from the machinations of a state 
by providing an avenue of redress in international law.141 By making the individual a 
subject of international law, international human rights law enabled an interrelationship 
of the principles of justice and legitimacy in the international sphere. Human rights law, 
essentially a codification of perceived principles of justice, introduced into the 
international legal order, a recognised body of associative obligations; existing as 
secondary and ultimate rules of recognition which engender compliance, not by consent 
of the States involved, but rather, by vi1iue of the status of statehood. 142 
1.2.3.3 The role of Judicial Lawmaking in Preserving Judicial Legitimacy 
Judicial lawmaking is understood to be as Judge Robe1i Jennings once wrote, the creation 
of law in the sense of developing, adapting, modifying, filling gaps, interpreting or even 
branching out in a new direction. 143 Though a controversial topic in intemationallaw, it is 
138 Bianchi writes of the metaphorical empty box that was created by article 53 of the VCL T, which 
recognises the existence of peremptory norms from which no derogation is permitted. He states that if the 
inventory of the box is difficult to draw, it is nevertheless difficult to deny that human rights are contained 
within it. Bianchi A, ' Human rights and the magic of jus cogens' 19 European Journal of International Law, 
491-508. 
139 "If we can introduce in the international field a category of law, namely jus co gens recently examined by 
the International Law Commission, a kind of imperative law which constitutes the contrast to jus 
dispositivum , capable of being changed by way of agreement between States, surely the law concerning the 
protection of human rights may be considered to belong to the jus cogens ' See South West Africa case 
(Ethiopia v South Africa: Liberia v South Africa), Second Phase, Judgment, I.C.J . Reports 1966, Judge 
Tanaka dissent, 250. 
140 These jus cogens norms include but are not limited to : freedom from torture, cruel and inhuman 
treatment, freedom from slavery, fi·eedom from arbitrary arrest and detention, the right to habeas corpus, the 
prohibition of genocide, prohibition of enforced disappearances, and the prohibition from refoulement. 
Cassese A, The human dimension of international law, Oxford University Press, New York, 2008, 75. 
141 Cassese A, The human dimension of international law, Oxford University Press, New York, 2008, 75 . 
142 Bianchi A, ' Human rights and the magic ofjus cogens' 19 European Journal of International Law, 491-
508. 
143 Shahabuddeen M, Precedent in the World Court, Cambridge University Press, New York, 1996, 1-31. 
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well perceived as a necessary function that inheres in the incompleteness of any system of 
rules. 144 However, no strict understanding of judicial lawmaking can be given. 145 It is 
instead to be understood as existing in a continuum, that progresses from mild forms such 
as rule interpretation and adaptation to moderate forms such as modification, filling gaps 
and development of the rules, to much severe forms such as branching out in a new 
direction. The mild and moderate forms are accepted as necessary in any system of rules. 
However, branching out in a new direction attracts questions of legitimacy of the rule that 
is developed by the judiciary. It is the latter, moderate and severe forms of judicial 
lawmaking that this paper confronts to establish the legitimacy of the rules thus 
constructed and the necessity of this kind of judicial lawmaking in the preservation of 
judicial legitimacy. 
Nienke Grossman, drawing from Professor Joseph Weiler, propounds that an 
international court of law, regardless of its mandate, has an inherent responsibility to give 
effect to existing peremptory norms. 146 She states that a court's refusal to honour these 
norms would lessen its normative legitimacy. 147 The reason, she asse1is, is because to do 
so, would fragment the enabling body of international law. 148 This could be explained by 
the fact that legitimacy in the international community is derived from adherence to the 
existing normative structure. Failure to adhere to the validating normative structure 
makes the constructed rule or the rule-making institution, lose its legitimacy. 149 
Consequently, an international court charged with the interpretation of a treaty on trade is 
not exempt from drawing from the inviolable human rights norms when violation of the 
core human rights obligations of a State are in question. 150 
144 Judicial lawmaking is enabled by the capacity of judicial precedent to create law. The unclear capacity 
of precedent in international law, makes the topic of judicial lawmaking a controversial one. See 
Shahabuddeen M, Precedent in the World Court, 1.3 I and Ginsburg T, 'International judicial lawmaking' 
Berkeley Journal of International Law, 2004, 3. 
145 Ginsburg T, 'International judicial lawmaking' Berkeley Journal of International Law, 2004, I. 
146 " International law prohibits states fi·om violating some core set of human rights guarantees, no matter 
what the circumstances. They cannot commit genocide, enslave, tm1ure, or engage in racial discrimination. 
Consequently, an international court's authority is justified when it helps states comply with these 
prohibitions and when it takes these prohibitions into account when issuing its decisions." Grossman N, 
'The normative legitimacy of international courts', 68-76. 
147 GrossmanN, 'The nonnative legitimacy of international courts', 68-76. 
148 GrossmanN, 'The normative legitimacy of international courts,' 65-76. 
149 Franck M T, The power of legitimacy among nations, I 92. 
150 GrossmanN, 'The nonnative legitimacy of international courts,' 65-76. 
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The conflict ansmg from these assertions IS noticeable. Governments endowing 
international comis with jurisdiction may exclude human rights jurisdiction from the 
courts. 151 This is tribute to the contest between the rules preserving sovereignty of states 
and those limiting state authority as human rights law does. 152 In principle, a court ' s 
technical finding that it has no jurisdiction to hear a matter, should stay exercise of its 
authority.153 To do so however, where the matter involves state violation of core human 
rights principles would delegitimise the same court, as it would be acting oblivious to the 
existing hierarchy of norms in internationallaw. 154 
Judges in ICs without a human rights mandate are not shielded from meeting these 
cases. 155 Recognising the compliance pull of core human rights norms and lacking the 
mandate to hear human rights matters, these judges respond by finding facts , identifying 
and interpreting relevant rules, filling lacunae in the law and eventually, by branching out 
in new directions. 156 This judicial lawmaking, in cases where it corrects the abrogation of 
peremptory norms embodied in core human rights State obligations, is done in adherence 
to the normative hierarchy in the international legal order. 157 Adherence to the normative 
hierarchy ensures a judicial pronouncement, rule or order that is normatively 
legitimate. 158 Consequently, judicial lawmaking is not only necessary but also crucial, 
when it comes to adjudication of core human rights norms, for the preservation of 
normative judiciallegitimacy.159 
Judicial lawmaking will hence transform the procedural rules of the court and m its 
substantive rules.160 Procedural rules may be altered to allow for greater access rules, 
151 Neither the EAC nor the SADC provided for a human rights mandate for the Coutt and Tribunal. This 
jurisdiction was to be determined by member States at a future date. See article 27(2) of the Treaty on the 
Establishment of the EAC GrossmanN, 'The normative legitimacy of international courts,' I 00. 
152 GrossmanN , 'The normative legitimacy of international coutts,' 65-76. 
153 GrossmanN , ' The normative legitimacy of international coutts,' 65-76. 
154 GrossmanN, ' The normative legitimacy of international coutts,' 65-76. 
155 "International courts and tribunals are deciding more disputes involving sovereign states than ever 
before. They no longer merely decide one-time disputes before them. They shape and promote specific 
nonnative regimes like international investment, human rights, humanitarian law, and trade law." Grossman 
N, 'The normative legitimacy of international courts,' 62-63 . 
156 Grossman N, ' The normative legitimacy of international courts,' 62. 
157 GrossmanN , 'The normative legitimacy of international courts,' 94-103. 
158 GrossmanN , ' The normative legitimacy of international coutts,' 94-103. 
159 GrossmanN, ' The normative legitimacy of international courts,' 94-103 . 
160 RUdiger' s work that identifies source-, procedure-, and result-oriented approaches for legitimating 
authority.Wolfrum R, 'Legitimacy in international law' Max-Planck Institut flir ausHindisches offentliches 
Recht und Volkrecht, 12. 
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which allow for greater participation by those to whom the pronounced rules apply. 161 
Substantive rules of the courts will alter the applicable law to allow for protection of core 
human rights. 162 Grossman conflates the concept of altering substantive rules with the 
inclusion of the principles of justice in evaluating the legitimacy of rules. 163 The 
transfmmation of these procedural and substantive rules, occur intra-judicially: enabling 
the court to adhere to normative principles, which in exchange, endow it with normative 
judicial legitimacy. 164 
1.3. Summary and Conclusion 
Tllis section has identified a theoretical justification for the exercise of judicial 
lawmaking by an IC to preserve its legitimacy. When an IC, not expressly mandated to 
hear human rights claims meets cases, which concern a state ' s violation of jus cogens 
norms and it exercises judicial lawmaking to give effect to these norms, such undertaking 
preserves the normative legitimacy of the IC regardless of State backlash. This is because, 
judicial lawmaking is a necessary process that allows for adherence to the norn1ative 
hierarchy of international norms and such adherence legitimises the constructed rule and 
the rule-making institution, Judicial lawmaking would potentially transform interpretation 
of the applicable law in two ways. The first would be to widen the procedural rules to 
give greater access to participants to whom the law would have an effect. The second, 
would be to widen substantively the interpretation of the applicable law to enable just 
ends to be met. Where judicial lawmaking occurs outside the prescribed ambit, legitimacy 
is threatened and State backlash could then serve as a true cue to the loss of the rule 
and/or the rule-making institution's legitimacy. The subsequent chapters examine this 
theory through an expository analysis of the sub-regional comis in Africa and their 
growing penchant for judicial lawmaking when confounded by human rights matters. 
161 GrossmanN, 'The normative legitimacy ofinternational courts,' 79-94. 
162 GrossmanN, 'The normative legitimacy of international cou11s,' 91-97. 
163 GrossmanN, 'The normative legitimacy of international cow1s,' 96- 103 . 
164 Rudiger Wolfrum, ' Legitimacy of International Law from a Legal Perspective: Some Introductory 
Considerations, in Legitimacy in international law,' 12. 
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II. AN EVALUATION OF JUDICIAL LAWMAKING AND JUDICIAL 
LEGITIMACY IN THE ECCJ 
2.1 A Brief History of the ECOW AS Community Court of Justice (ECCJ) 
The 1991 Community Protocol to the 1975 ECOWAS Treaty created the ECOWAS 
Community Court of Justice (ECCJ).165 It entered into force in 1996. 166 The Court's main 
purpose was to enable economic integration among member States. 167 It was authorised to 
hear and adjudicate first, disputes arising between member states or the Authority, when 
such disputes arose between the Member States or between one or more Member States 
and the Community. Secondly, the Court could hear proceedings instituted by a member 
state on behalf of its nationals against another member state or institution of the 
Community, after attempts to settle the disputes amicably had failed. 168 This section 
traces how the REC Comt acquired a human rights mandate, its exercise of judicial 
lawmaking and the impact on its legitimacy. The evaluation begins with the first case 
heard by the ECCJ, which was itself, a human rights case. 
2.1.1 The Afolabi Decision 
In Afolabi v Nigeria 169 a Nigerian trader, entered into a contract to purchase goods m 
Benin. Afolabi could not complete the transaction because Nigeria had closed the borders 
between the two countries. He filed the suit alleging that the closure had violated his right 
to free movement of persons and goods. Nigeria challenged the court's jurisdiction and 
Afolabi ' s standing, arguing that the 1991 protocol did not authorize private parties to 
litigate before the Court. 170 
165 Protocol A/P. 117/91 on the Community Comt of Justice. 
166 Many stipulate that the reason for delay in ratification was because the supra-national concept lacked 
supp01t among the member states. See Alter K, Helfer L and McAllister J, 'A new international human 
rights court for West Africa: The ECOWAS community court of justice', 737-779. 
167 Protocol A/P. 117/91 on the Community Comt of Justice. 
168A1ticle 9 (2) and (3) of the Protocol A/P. 1/7/91 on the Community Comt of Justice. 
169 ECW/CCJ/APP/01 /03: Afolabi Olajide v Federal Republic of Nigeria. 
170 It is imp01tant to note that Afolabi countered on an interpretative front and asked the court to read the 
word 'may' in the proviso, 'A member state may on behalf of its nationals institute proceedings against 
another member state' as permitting states to raise such cases but not precluding the court· from hearing 
applications from individuals . He also involved the principles of equity in the 199 I protocol to assuage the 
comt to employ a purposive interpretation of the court's jurisdiction. Afolabi v. Nigeria, Case No. 
ECW/CCJ/APP/0 1/03 . 
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The comi ruled in favour of the government. The reason was because Aliicle 9 of the 
1991 protocol was plain and unambiguous to the effect that only states could institute 
proceedings on behalf of nationals. 171 
2.1.2 Consequences of the Afolabi decision 
This case brought to fore the need for reform of the Court's procedural and substantive 
rules. 172 This first case concerned a supposed abrogation of a community right. 173 These 
are defined as rights, which derive their existence from the Community. The existence of 
these 'community' rights would not serve any integration purpose unless their 
beneficiaries could access both national courts and the regional Comi to enforce the 
vested rights in case of a violation. The judges exercised judicial restraint and did not 
interpret the substantive or procedural rules to allow for adjudication. 174 Ukaigwe reports 
that the ECCJ was in fear of legitimacy challenges that the Court of Justice of the 
European Union (CJEU) faced in response to their broad interpretation of the Rome 
Treaty to allow for individual access rules. 175 The judges however, coordinated 
campaigns with civil society and non-governmental organisations for the review of the 
Protocol. 176 This led to member states, agreeing to expand the Court's authority, most 
notably giving it a capacious human rights mandate as enshrined in the 2005 Protocol. 177 
2.1.3 The 2005 Protocol 
171 The coutt proposed a literal interpretation of the Protocol regardless of whether states would be insulated 
against suits by their own nationals alleging violations of ECOW AS rules. See Afolabi Olajide v Federal 
Republic of Nigeria and Alter K, Helfer L, and McAllister J, 'A new international human rights court for 
West Africa: The ECOW AS community coutt of justice' I 07 American Journal of International Lm·v 2013 
737-779. 
172 Alter K, Helfer L, and McAllister J, ' A new international human rights court for West Africa: The 
ECOWAS community comt of justice,' 737-779. 
173 Afolabi 0/ajide v Nigeria. See, Ukaigwe J, Ecowas law, Springer International Publishing, Switzerland, 
2016, 18. 
174 Afolabi asked the Comt to interpret the word 'may' in the proviso, "A member State may on behalf of 
its nationals institute proceedings against another member State" as permitting States to raise such cases but 
not precluding the Coutt from hearing applications fi·om individuals. He also relied on the principles of 
equity in the 1991 protocol to ask the Court to employ a purposive interpretation of the Comt's jurisdiction. 
See Afolabi Olajide v Nigeria. 
175 Ukaigwe J, Ecmvas law, 18. 
176 Alter K, Helfer L, and McAllister J, 'A new international human rights comt for West Africa: The 
ECOWAS community court of justice,' 737-779. 
177 Atticle 4 (d) Supplementary Protocol A/SP. J/01/05 amending the preamble and articles I, 2, 9 and 30 of 
the Protocol A/ P.I/7/91 relating to the Community Comt of Justice and article 4(1) ofthe English version 
of the said Protocol. 
?" _ _, 
The 2005 most important provisions appear in two articles. Article 3 revised Article 9 of 
the 1991 Protocol and listed each ground for jurisdiction. The fom1h paragraph provided 
that the Court has jurisdiction to determine cases of human rights violations occurring in 
any member state. 178 Article 4 revised the previous Article 10 of the 1991 Protocol. It 
provided that the Court could receive complaints from litigants concerning relief for 
violation of their human rights. 179 Despite the simplicity in the provisions, they 
overhauled the structure of the Com1 and created one peculiar to other human rights 
courts by espousing tlu·ee distinctive features of the Com1. 180 
a) An indeterminate human rights jurisdiction 
b) Direct access for private litigants 
c) No requirement for exhaustion oflocal remedies 181 
This created a Com1 with not only an extensive human rights mandate, but also provided 
the avenue for judicial lawmaking as will be analysed below. 
2.2 Post Afolabi ECCJ jurisprudence 
The tlu·ee above-enumerated features in the Supplementmy Protocol enabled the judges' 
judicial lawmaking, which in moderate and mild forms has taken the forms of creating 
law by interpreting, adapting, filling gaps. In more severe forms, the law espoused by the 
Court has branched out in a new direction. This section evaluates judicial lawmaking 
tlu·ough the use of selected human rights cases through which the Court pronounced itself, 
on new interpretations of the applicable law. 
2.2.1 Judicial lawmaking on Procedural Rules of the Court 
2.2.1.1. Procedural access for private litigants provision 
It is predictable, that considering the effect of direct access for private litigants in an 
international human rights court, such a feature would come under attack by governments. 
It not only de-nestles the concept of state sovereignty but also completely restructures the 
principles of international law as are known. The Court has nevertheless developed this 
178 Atticle 3(4) ofSupplementmy Protocol A/S.P/01 /05. 
179 Atticle 4 (d) ofSupplementaty Protocol A/S.P/01105. 
18°Karen J. Alter, Laurence R. Helfer, and Jacqueline R. McAllister, 'A new international human rights 
comt for West Africa: The ECOWAS community court of justice.' 2013 . 
181 Articles 3 and 4 Supplementary Protocol A/S.P/0 1/05. 
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concept judicially, leaving no doubt as to its existence and expanding the reach of the 
feature to cover Non-Govermnental Organisations (NGOs). 
Despite the provision in the Protocol allowing individual access to the Court, Nigeria 
argued, in the case of Tidjani v Federal Republic of Nigeria that the individual applicant, 
Tidjiani, had no right of access to the ECCJ. 182 The issue was the violation of rights of a 
private litigant who claimed that he had suffered as a result of arbitrary arrest occasioned 
in his country of residence, Benin, and forceful extradition to his country of origin, 
Nigeria. 183 Despite the Comi's decision to rule in favour ofNigeria, the ECOWAS Comi 
emphasized the procedural rule that private litigants had direct access to the court when 
they claimed that their rights were violated.184 To rule otherwise, would have opened the 
Court up to legitimacy questions as the issue, involving the violation of core human rights 
norms necessitated application of a rule which allowed greater access to those involved; 
in this case, individuals. Clarifying the rule enabled judicial lawmaking that broadened 
the provision to include access to the Court by NGOs. 185 
2.2.1.2. Judicial lawmaking aided by the procedural lack of 'requirement to 
exhaust local remedies' provision. 
The requirement to exhaust local remedies consists a provision of customary international 
law (CIL).186 However, the procedmal requirement for exhaustion of local remedies is not 
an express provision in the Supplementary 2005 Protocol to the ECCJ. 187 Considering 
that the exhaustion of local remedies has gained CIL status, in the exception of an express 
provision that provides for non-exhaustion in the treaty, or the lack of an implied 
intention by the drafters of the Protocol to avoid the application of the provision, it would 
be expected that CIL would apply to fill the lacuna. This is indeed the argument that 
member states have employed demanding an exhaustion of local remedies before the 
182ECW/CCJ/APP/O I/06: Alhaji Hammani Tidjiani v Federal Republic of Nigeria & 4 others. 
183 Ukaigwe J, 'ECOWAS Law' Institutions ofthe community Springer Publications, 78. 
184 The Court also emphasised the right of private litigants to access the Court in ECW/CCJ/APP/08/09: 
Socio-Economic Rights and Accountability Project v. Federal Republic of Nigeria 59-6!. 
185 Socio-Economic Rights and Accountability Project v. Federal Republic of Nigeria. 
186lnterhandel case 
187 In ECW/CCJ/APP/05/08 : Ocean King Nigeria Limited v Republic of Senegal paragraph 38, the Comt 
stated that the provisions in the Protocol do not require directly or indirectly, the exhaustion of local 
remedies before an action was admissible in Comt. 
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Comi. 188 However, the Court has repeatedly rejected this m a creatively constructed 
argument that branches out in an unforeseen direction. 
Advanced in the cases of A1ani Karaou v Niger 189 and the case of Saidykhan v The 
Gambia 190, the Court held that the provision could not be ousted by implication. It stated 
that the rule is not inflexible since it can be legislated away or compromised by the 
parties. In Mani Karaou, the Court found that rather than allow the exception of the 
requirement to exhaust local remedies only in cases where such provision for exception 
has been expressly elucidated in the treaty, onus was instead on the drafters to ensure that 
the provision was provided, without which, the Comi construed, that the intention was 
not to allow the exception. 
This novel interpretation of the rule allowed the Comi to hear cases concerning gross 
violation of human rights norms. By circumnavigating a vestigial, State centred provision 
of international law; this Comi broadened the procedural access rules to individuals and 
cases that would previously not have been admitted in an international human rights 
tribunal. 191 This was made possible by the Comi's adjudication of cases involving 
violations of peremptory norms by member states. Obliquely, the Comi seemed to 
suggest that the rule in CIL could be supplanted as a result of adherence to a highly 
placed norm in the hierarchy of norms. This was not only novel, but incredibly illustrative 
of the ability of judicial lawmaking to increase the legitimacy of a rule-interpreting 
institution. 192 
2.2.2 Judicial law making on the Substantive rules of the Court 
2.2.1.3. The Court's indeterminate human rights jurisdiction 
188See ECW/CCJ/APP/05/05: Professor Etim Moses Essien v Republic of The Gambia and another, 
ECW/CCJ/APP/08/07: Dame Hadijatou Mani Koraou v. Niger, ECW/CCJ/APP/05/08: Ocean King Nigeria 
Limited v Republic of Senegal, ECW/CCJ/ APPill/07: Musa Saidykhan v. The Republic of the Gambia and 
ECW/CCJ/APP/01/05: Han. Dr. Jmy Ugokwe v Federal Republic of Nigeria. 
189 The Comt in Dame Hadijatou Mani Koraou v. Niger held that the absence of the provision is not a 
lacuna to be filled and the court could not impose on individuals more onerous conditions and formalities 
than those provided for by the texts without infringing on the rights of such individuals. 
190 Musa Saidykhan v. The Republic of the Gambia. 
191 Ukaigwe J, 'ECOWAS Law'78. 
192 Ukaigwe J, 'ECOWAS Law' 78. 
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The lack of mention of the treaty that the Court interprets provides wide interpretation 
tools. In the Gambian cases, 193 the Court had to adjudicate in cases where the government 
had conveniently not ratified the Convention Against Tmture (CAT). Despite the fact that 
the Cou11 could have adjudicated by asse1ting that torture is a recognised violation of jus 
cogens, the Comt instead declared that it was not limited to State ratified human rights 
treaties. 194 Predictably, this decision faced criticism as it overlooked the concept of 
'consent to be bound', a pillar guiding the law of treaties.195 Essentially, the lack of a 
clearly defined human rights jurisdiction means that the Comt has the avenue to give 
effect to human rights principles that individual states are not bound by for the purpose of 
preventing State impunity. 196 Consequently, the decision-fuelled backlash from the 
Gambian government that was not successful in clawing back the Court's authority.197 
The Court has also pronounced that it has the mandate to regularly apply the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights and other UN human rights conventions that member states 
have ratified as was seen in the cases of Alade v Nigeria 198and the case of Keita v 
Mali. 199 This broadens the scope of human rights instruments that are enforceable by the 
ECCJ to include 'soft law.' 
The potency of this is illustrative in the case of Mani Kouraou v Niger. 200 This case is 
considered historical, as it is one of the first slavety cases to be won in the international 
193 Musa Saidykhan v. The Republic of the Gambia and ECW /CCJ/ APP/04/07: Chief Ebrimah Manneh v. 
The Republic of the Gambia. 
194Aiter K, Heifer Land McAllister J, ' A new international human rights coUit for West Africa: The 
ECOWAS community court of justice' I 07, American Journal of International Law, (20 I 3), 737-779. 
195 Heifer L, 'Terminating treaties' accessed at: d:/womat-filecopy/0001537712.30634 on 11/4/16 at 
12:50:09. 
196 This was the argument that was advanced by civil society later, when the decision occasioned backlash 
from the Gambian government.as quoted from Karen Alter's article, Four IFEX Members, Civil Society 
Groups Fear Gambia Proposal Will Prevent ECOWAS Court from Ruling in Saidykhan Case, IFEX (Sept. 
28, 2009), at http://www.ifex.org/west africa/2009/09/28/ecowas court jurisdiction/ This understanding 
has not shielded the CoUit fi·om criticism that its wide judicial interpretation mandate could be construed as 
an overbroad delegation to interpret extensively, a rapidly evolving area of international law. Ebobrah ST, 
'Critical issues in the human rights mandate of the ECOWAS Court of Justice' , 54 J. African Law Institute 
3-7 (2010). 
197 See Alter K, Heifer Land McAllister J, 'A new international human rights court for West Africa: The 
ECOWAS community court of justice', 737-779. 
198 A lade v. Nigeria, Case No. ECW/CCJ/APP/05/11, Judgment, para. 24 (June II, 20 12). 
199 Keita v. Mali, Case No. ECW/CCJ/APP/05/06, Judgment, para. 34 (Mar. 22, 2007). 
200 Hadijatou Mani Koraou v. Niger, Case No. ECW/CCJ/APP/08/07, Judgment, paras. 74-75, 77 (Oct. 27, 
2008) 
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levei.2°1 The judges cited varwus sources m reaffinning the international peremptory 
norm against slavery. 202 The Court, in a non-conventional decision, also adopted the 
definition of modern day slavery and consequently developed the law as understood in 
light of the Slavery Convention203 that was adopted by the International Criminal 
Tribunal of the Former Yugoslavia.204 
The proviSion has enabled the use of judicial lawmaking to g1ve effect to general 
principles or norms underlying the international legal order. 205 In reinforcing its lack of a 
determinate human rights jurisdiction, the Court has been able to exercise judicial 
lawmaking (through drawing on accepted principles of human rights law), in respect of 
existing norms, to give redress to gross violations of human rights norms and essentially, 
preserve its judicial, moral and normative legitimacy. 206 
2.3 Analysis of the ECCJ 
Reform of the Court gave it express jurisdiction to hear and adjudicate human rights 
matters. Despite the mandate however, interpretation of the enabling treatY provisions 
required the exercise of judicial lawmaking to enhance the Court's normative and moral 
legitimacy.207 The definition of moral legitimacy is best given by Grover who studies the 
legitimacy of courts mandated to hear human rights matters. She finds that legitimacy in 
such cases demands moral integrity to the underlying fundamental norms explained in 
Part IJ.2°8 She terms this as moral legitimacy. This makes the ECCJ an interesting Court 
to study as it reveals the importance of judicial lawmaking even for international 
institutions endowed to hear human rights matters. 
20 1 Duffy H, ' Hadijtatou Mani Koraou v Niger: Slavery unveiled by the ECOWAS Court' Human Rights 
Lmv Review (2009) Oxford University Press. 
202 The Court cited the case of Barcelona Traction, Judgment, ICJ reports, 1970, para 33 and 34 and the 
cases of Prosecutor v Dragoljub Kunarac and others (ICT-Y) Judgment IT- 96-23 and IT-96-23/IA (200 I) 
and Prosecutor v Mi/01·ad Krnoj elac IT-97-25 (2002). 
203 Article 1(1) ofthe Slavery Convention of 1926. 
204 Prosecutor v Dragoljub Kunarac and others (ICT-Y) Judgment IT- 96-23 and IT-96-23/IA (2001) and 
Prosecutor v Mil01·ad Krnojelac IT-97-25 (2002). This was done in a judicially innovative context that 
allowed the Comt to view the 1929 Convention in light of differentiating concepts: the "notion of 
ownership" and the "rights to ownership over a person." 
205 See Alter K, Helfer Land McAllister J, 'A new international human rights coutt for West Africa: The 
ECOWAS community coutt of justice', 737-779. 
206 See Alter K, Helfer Land McAllister J, 'A new international human rights court for West Africa: The 
ECOWAS community court of j ustice' , 737-779. 
207 Ukaigwe J, 'ECOWAS Law ' Institutions ofthe community Springer Publications. 
208 Grover S, The European Court of Human Rights as a pathway to impunity for international crimes, 
Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2010. 
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There are undeniably situations when the Court exposed judicial restraint in its 
adjudication.209 Most of these consist of decisions that reveal the conflicting tensions 
between respect for judicial subservience to state sovereignty and the Court's duty in the 
protection of fundamental human rights. Ukaigwe finds that some of these decisions, such 
as Tidjiani and the Hissene Habre case, lessened the legitimacy of the Court.210 The 
Court's failure to give cognisance to fundamental norms of international law found in the 
body of IHRL, contravened the Court's adherence to normative hierarchy, thereby, 
lessening its legitimacy. 211 In contrast, in Ugokwe v Nigeria, the Court attempted to 
actively circumnavigate the restraints on its jurisdiction and proclaim its authority. 
However, the issue concerned an election dispute. To do so, would have also been in 
contravention to the hierarchy of norms and the action did temporarily cause a maning of 
the Court's legitimacy.212 
The response by the Gambian government following the decisions on Saidykhan and 
Manneh yielded an unsuccessful backlash. A successful backlash would have constituted 
a false cue as to the legitimacy of the Court. Other member countries, though themselves 
taunted by the broad interpretation powers of the Comi, restrained themselves and 
rebuffed Gambia's suggestions to reign in the Comi. This was in recognition of the 
Court's legitimate aims: for which they also had an obligation to comply.213 The ECCJ 
has managed to stay within the ambit of legitimate interpretation of normative principles 
by weighing the different compliance pulls exerted by conflicting principles and hence, 
subverted a successful backlash. 
2.4 Conclusion 
209See the cases of Tidjani v. Nigeria, Case Judgment, para. 22 (July 2007), Amazou Henri and others v the 
Republic of Cote D' lvoire 2009, Hissene Habre c Republique du Senegal, ECW/CCJ/APP/07/08, I grH 
November 20 I 0 among others. 
210 Ukaigwe J, 'ECOWAS Law' Institutions ofthe community Springer Publications, 79. 
211 Ukaigwe J, 'ECOWAS Law' Institutions ofthe community Springer Publications, 79. 
212 See ECW/CCJ/APP/0 1/05: Han. Dr. Jeny Ugokwe v Federal Republic of Nigeria, and Karen J. Alter, 
Laurence R. Helfer, and Jacqueline R. McAllister, 'A new international human rights court for West Africa: 
The ECOWAS community court of justice, 737-779. 
213Karen J. Alter, Laurence R. Helfer, and Jacqueline R. McAllister, 'A new international human rights 
court for West Africa: The ECOWAS community court of justice, 737-779. 
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Within a decade, the Court had in five cases, broadened the Court's procedural access 
rules and its substantive rules to allow for individual access and greater human rights 
violations redresses as a result of judicial lawmaking.214 The Court pronounced itself on 
most of these cases by asserting that the rights of individuals could not be taken away by 
mere implication. This way, the Comi was able create and asseti its indetem1inate human 
rights jurisdiction, clarify individual access and broaden it to include NGOs and free itself 
from the provision to exhaust local remedies. This was done in cases that involved 
ultimate human rights norms, which underlie international law, bringing about an 
adherence to norms that gave the Court moral and normative legitimacy.215 
2 14 These are Musa Saidykhan v. The Republic of the Gambia, Chief Ebrimah Manneh v. The Republic of 
the Gambia, Hadijatou Mani Koraou v. Niger, Socio-Economic Rights and Accountability Project v. 
Federal Republic of Nigeria and Ocean King Nigeria Limited v Republic of Senegal. 
215 Ukaigwe J, ' ECOWAS Law ' Institutions ofthe community Springer Publications, I IO. 
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III. AN EVALUATION OF JUDICIAL LAWMAKING AND JUDICIAL 
LEGITIMACY IN THE EACJ 
3.1 A brief history 
Unlike the ECCJ's history, the EACJ lacks a definite period in which the Court 
transitioned from a tribunal focussed on economic integration among its members into a 
Court exercising human rights jurisdiction.2 16 The Court's inauguration in 2001 as a 
judicial community organ for the East African Community (EAC) did not foreshadow a 
human rights development. One could even argue that it precluded it. 217 
The EACJ represents a comi whose jurisdiction was tethered by the negotiating member 
states. Their resolve to shield the represented states' sovereignty made them withhold a 
human rights mandate from the Court. Herein lies a representation of the existing 
antagony between antediluvian concepts of international law which viewed the state as 
their fulcrum and the emerging notions of justice brought to fore by human rights 
principles. The Court has instead adhered to the governing principles and norms 
underlying international law, asse1iing a seamless rubric of ultimate rules of recognition, 
which enable the interpretation, and application of international law rules. Regardless of 
its lacking an express mandate to hear human rights matters, the EACJ has recognized 
state responsibility to respect prevailing jus cogens norms. This has strengthened its 
legitimacy in the region. 
3.2 An analysis of the EACJ's jurisprudence 
Jurisprudence coming from the East African Comi of Justice (EACJ) is shrouded in the 
cloak of judicial creativity from the very onset.21 8 Unlike the ECCJ, which espoused 
restraint when confom1ded by a human rights question at a time when it lacked 
jmisdiction ratione materiae to adjudicate on the same, it was the EACJ's bold judicial 
216 Wolfgang H. Thome, Seek Justice at the East African Court, Registrar Tells Environmentalists and 
Conservationists, Wolfgang H. Thome's blog (Mar. 24, 2012), · 
http://wo lfgan ghthome. wordpress.com/20 12/03/24/seek-j ustice-at -the-east -african-coUit -registrar-
tellsenvironmentalists-and-conservationists Rwanda and Burundi became members I 0 years after its 
establishment. The early members were Kenya, Uganda, Tanzania. 
217Aticle 27(2) of the Treaty for the Establishment of the East African Community. 
218 J Gathii, ' Mission creep or a search for relevance: the East African CoUit of Justice's human rights 
strategy' 24, Duke Journal of Comparative and International Law, 2013, 249-294. The primary purpose of 
the EAC is to establish a customs union, a common market, a monetary union and ultimately, a political 
federation . In 2005, the EAC became a customs union and in 20 I 0, it became a common market. The rest 
are yet to be achieved . 
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undertaking that allowed for the creation of a human rights mandate. The first case before 
the Court that included a human rights angle was the Katabazi case. It is from this case 
that a gradual development of the concepts can be espied. 
3.2.1 The James Katabazi Decision219 
This case concerned the arbitrary re-anest and detention of sixteen people by Ugandan 
security personnel , after the Ugandan High Court' s issue of bail. The detainees claimed 
that in doing so, the government had breached articles 6, 7(2) and 8(1)(c) of the Treaty 
for the Establishment of the East African Community (EAC).220 The Court stipulated that 
it did not have jurisdiction to hear human rights matters.22 1 Such jurisdiction would have 
to be granted by the Council through a Supplementary Protocol. In the absence of the 
Protocol, the Comi was precluded from adjudicating human rights issues.222 However, the 
Court read articles 5, 6, 7 and 8 as guidance on conduct of Member States in fulfilment of 
the EAC Treaty. In doing so, it found that it could not be reasonably expected to abdicate 
from its jurisdiction of interpretation of the EAC Treaty as provided for under miicle 27(1) 
merely as a result of the fact that reference included among other allegations, allegations 
of human rights violations.:m 
The Court constructed a principle. It stated that where other issues threaten the realisation 
of the Community ' s objectives other than alleged human rights violations; the Court 
ought not abdicate its responsibility to interpret the Treaty as a result of the alleged 
human rights violations. The subtle innovation enabled the Court to adjudicate on human 
219 James Katabazi v Secretmy General of the EAC, Ref. No. I of2007, at 2 
220 Article 6, that Member States ought to adhere to the principles of good govemance inc luding adherence 
to the principles of democracy, the rule of law. accountabili ty. transparency, soc ial justice, equal 
opportuni ties. gender eq uali ty. as we ll as the recogni ti on. promotion and protection of human and peoples 
rights in accordance with the provisions of the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights. Article 7 
re iterates the same principles while article 8 places an onus on member states to refrain fi·o rn jeopardizing 
achievement of the objectives of the Treaty or those of the commun ity. 
221James Katabazi v Secretmy General of the EAC, ' Does this Court have jurisdiction to deal with human 
rights issues? The quick answer is : No it does not have.' Page 14. 
222 Article 27(2) of the EAC Treaty 
223 'While the Cowt will not assume jurisdiction to adjudicate on human rights disputes, it will not abdicate 
from exercising its jurisdiction of interpretation under A1ticle 27 (I) merely because the reference includes 
allegation of human rights violation. ' page 16 of the Katabazi decision, James Katabazi v Secret my General 
of the EAC. The Katabazi reference included among other issues, the abrogation of the principle of the rule 
of law, good governance and the principle of democracy. A reading of a1ticle 8 of the Treaty provides that, 
a failure to honour these principles constitutes jeopardizing the objectives of the Community as provided 
under the Treaty. 
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rights issues.224 The following sub-section illustrates an analysis on the human rights 
jurisprudence post Katabazi. 
3.2.2 Post Katabazi Jurisprudence 
Post Katabazi reveals a bolder initiative to tackle human rights violations disputes. 
Consider the Rugumba v Secretary General of the East Afi-ican Community225 case, which 
was brought on behalf of a Rwandan Citizen that was held incommunicado without trial 
for five months. The court, relying on article 6(d) and 7(2) asserted that Rwanda was in 
breach of its obligations to the Treaty as it had failed to adhere to the principles of good 
governance and the rule of law. In the case of Independent Medical Legal Unit v Attorney 
General of Kenya 226involving acts of torture, cruelty and inhuman and degrading 
treatment committed by agents of the government of Kenya on people in the Mount 
Elgon area, the court relied on the arguments supplied above to show that it had 
jurisdiction to hear the claim. 
3.2.3 The Anyang' Nyong'o Backlash 
The backlash towards the Court came as a result of a non-human rights issue. It was 
occasioned by the Anyang Nyong'o case.227 The legal issue before the Court was 
interpretation of article 50 of the Treaty. The rniicle mandated that members be elected to 
the East African Legislative Assembly (EALA). The Kenyan government had instead, 
appointed them. The Opposition approached the Court in retaliation and the Comi ruled 
in favour of the applicants. The Kenyan government orchestrated a most devastating 
backlash to the EACJ.228 The result was an introduction of a two-month time limit for 
private litigants filing complaints challenging national decisions or actions contrary to the 
Treaty, 229 reform of the Court into two divisions; a first division and an appellate division 
and appeal rules.230 These were structured to curb the Court's future judicial lawmaking. 
224 Possi A, 'Its official: The East African Court of Justice can now adjudicate human rights cases' Africa 
Law accessed at https://www.africlaw.com It is critical to note that almost 90% of the cases that have come 
before the Comt since then concern human rights violations. 
225 Ref. No.8 of2010 
226 Attorney Gen. of Kenya v. Independent Medical Legal Unit , App. No. I of 2011 (App. Div. Mar. 15, 
20 12), available at http://eacj.huriweb.org/wp-content/uploads/20 1211 1/No-1-of-20 I O.pdf. 
227 Anyang Nyong'o v Attorney Gen. of Kenya, Ref. No. I of2006, 
228 Alter K, Gathii J and Helfer L, 'Backlash against international courts in West, East and Southern Africa: 
Causes and Consequences' 27, European Journal of International Law, 2016. 
229Revised EAC Treaty atticle 30(2). 
230 Revised East Africa Community Treaty articles 26(1), 26(2) and 27(1). 
It was a judicially expansive approach that enabled the Court's circumnavigation of the 
imposed hindrances, enabling it to deal conclusively with human rights matters. This 
happened through development of the continuing violations doctrine and the court's 
asse11ions on the requirement to exhaust local remedies. 
3.2.4 Emergence of the continuing violations doctrine 
In the Independent Medico Legal Unit case,231 the main contentious issue before the 
Courts was whether the time-bar imposed under article 30(2) barred the Court from 
hearing the matter which concerned ubiquitous human rights violations.232 Evidence was 
adduced to show that IMLU had known about the government's failure to investigate at 
least one and a half years before filing suit. The time restriction under article 30(2) had 
hence, not been complied with. The First Instance Division (FID) responded by stating 
that the time-bar was not applicable as the violations were of a continuing character. The 
government's failure to provide a remedy was continuing up to the point the applicants 
filed their application. 
The Appellate division reversed the ruling of the FID and found that the time-bar denied 
the Court jurisdiction to hear the matter. The Com1 found that "continuing violations "or 
"continuing breaches" were not recognised as an exception to application of at1icle 30(2). 
Consequently, the Appellate division succeeded in curbing a most expansive judicial 
undetiaking through strict construction of the Treaty. The FID reassetied its initial finding 
on continuing violations, in the case of Omar Awadh and Six Others.233 It found that 
arbitrary detention consisted of a continuing violation. The Appellate division reversed 
this finding by reasset1ing its position that continuing breaches were not a substantive 
exception to the requirement by article 30(2).234 
231 Attorney Gen. of Kenya v. Independent Medical Legal Unit, App. No. I of 2011 (App. Div. Mar. 15, 
2012). 
232 The issues involved abrogation of the rule of law, democracy and principles of good governance as seen 
in article 6(d) of the Treaty. This was noted in both the First Instance Division and the newly created 
Appellate division.also 232 Attorney Gen. of Kenya v. Independent Medical Legal Unit, App. No. I of2011 
(App. Div. Mar. 15, 20 12). 
233 Omar Awadh and Six Others v Attorney General of Uganda and Attorney General of Kenya (EACJ) 
First Instance Division App No 4/20 II . 
234 Attorney General of Uganda and Attorney General of Kenya v Omar Awadh and Six Others (EACJ) 
Appellate Division App No 2/20 12. 
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The Plaxeda Rugumba case reveals a thawing in the Appellate Division position.235 
Following its previous decisions, the FID found that the time bar (from the Colonel's 
arrest to the filing of the case) did not apply as the Rwandan government's failure to 
provide a remedy was one failure in a continuous chain of events.236 The Appellate 
Division avoided the use of "continuous breaches" but held that the application was not 
time barred. The Court found that the government of Rwanda retained information 
regarding the Colonel ' s arrest and the information was never supplied to the applicant, 
making it impossible to identify precisely when the time began to run. Future 
constructions of this nature by the Appellate Division guaranteed a more "human rights 
responsive" Court. 
The 'continuing violations' doctrine is used to afford an international comi a remedy, 
consistent with international law, to the challenge posed of ex post facto application of 
human rights treaties.237 The doctrine's use is to expand the temporal jurisdiction of a 
Court. The FID employed the doctrine within its known confines238 to address grave 
violations of human rights. It creatively used the doctrine to expand its temporal 
jurisdiction over matters that were time-barred under article 30(2). The claw-back 
responses of the Appellate division curtailed progressive judicial lawmaking. However, 
its own recent responses reveal a unity of mind developing between the divisions. 
3.2.5 The Court's response on the requirement to exhaust local remedies 
The Court's response on the requirement to exhaust local remedies reveals deliberate 
creation of a greater avenue for judicial lawmaking.239 Similar to ECCJ's jurisprudence, 
the First Instance Division ruled that the applicant was not barred from seeking remedy in 
235 Plaxeda Rugumba v Secretmy General of the EAC and Attorney General of Rwanda (EAC) First 
Instance Division, Ref No 8 of 20 I OThe case concerned detention incommunicado of one Lieutenant 
Colonel Seveline Rugigana Ngabo. 
236 Secretmy General of the EAC and Attorney General of Rwanda v Plaxeda Rugumba (EAC) Appellate 
Division, RefNo I of2012. 
237 Altiparmak K, 'The application of the concept of continuing violation to the duty to investigate, 
prosecute and punish under international human rights law' Turkish Yearbook of Human Rights (1999-2004) 
3-50. 
238 It is argued by Grover that the doctrine of continuing violations is used in cases of grave violations of 
human rights: Tmture, arbitrary arrest; inclusive of detention incommunicado, enforced disappearances, 
genocide, crimes against humanity among others. See Grover S, The European Court of Human Rights as a 
pathway to impunity for international crimes, Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 20 I 0. 
239• Plaxeda Rugumba v Secretmy General of the EAC and Attorney General of Rwanda (EAC) First 
Instance Division , RefNo 8 of201. 
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the EACJ, as the EAC Treaty did not provide for the requirement to exhaust local 
remedies. The Appellate Division rebuffed the FID's assertion by asserting that there 
were no available remedies in Rwanda for the applicant. 240 It is not clear what the 
Appellate Division meant by these assertions and the pronouncement by the FID is ripe 
for development akin to that of the ECCJ. 
3.2.6 A clear human rights jurisdiction: Democratic Party v SecretarJ' 
General of the EAC and others case241 
Despite its penchant for judicial restraint, the most judicially expansive decision came 
from the Appellate division. The case concerned the delay by Kenya, Uganda, Rwanda 
and Burundi to file declarations under article 34(6) of the Protocol to the Creation of the 
ACtHPR.242 The applicant contended that such delay was in violation of the EAC 
Member States ' duties under the African Charter to promote human rights in their 
jurisdictions.243 The issue rested purely on a human rights ground. FID ruled that it only 
had the mandate to hear and adjudicate matters concerning the interpretation of the EAC 
Treaty. In a peculiar undertaking, the Appellate Division unreservedly held that it had the 
jurisdiction to interpret the African Charter by virtue of article 6( d) and 7(2) of the EAC 
Treaty.244 Consequently, in as far as article 6(d) recognised the African Charter's 
relevance in promotion and protection of human rights, then compliance with the Charter, 
became ipso jure, an obligation imposed upon Member States by the Treaty.245 
The result of the decision was double fold. One was to take away the approach used in 
Katabazi and its consequent jurisprudence. The EACJ did not have to prove anymore, the 
existence of other violations of the EAC Treaty to adjudicate on a human rights matter in 
a particular case. The Court could adjudicate solely on human rights matters. Secondly, 
the Court identified its applicable law as the African Chatier and universally accepted 
240 The appellate division asse11ed that the requirement has the status of CIL, though not contained in the 
EAC Treaty and caution should be taken not to distort the Treaty in Plaxeda Rugumba v Secretwy General 
of the EAC and another. 
24 1 (EAC) Appellate Division Appeal No. I of201 4. 
242Article 5 of the Protocol to the Afri can Charter on the creation of the ACtHPR. Such a declaration would 
allow individuals and Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs), direct access to the ACtHPR. 
243 Paragraph 15-17 ofthe Democratic Alliance decision. 
244 ' Articles 6 (d) and 7(2) of the Treaty empower the East African Court of Justice to apply the provisions 
of the Charter, the Vienna Convention, as well as any other relevant international instrl!ment to ensure the 
Pa11ner States ' observance of the provisions of the Treaty, as well as those of other. international 
instruments to which the Treaty makes reference. ' paragraph 69 of the Democratic Alliance case. 
245Paragraph 71 of the Democratic Alliance case. 
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standards of human rights. 246 The decision, asserted the Court' s human rights jurisdiction, 
affirming the gradual development of the Court' s mandate to a fully-fledged human rights 
tribunal. A journey traversed entirely, on judicially activist wheels. 
3.3 An analysis and conclusion on the EACJ jurisprudence 
The jurisprudence of the EACJ reveals a bold tribunal. Unlike the ECCJ, the EACJ has 
tlu·ough incremental innovative steps, asserted its own jurisdiction to hear human rights 
matters. It has been argued that this is a usurpation of the legislative role of the 
Community parliament. 247However, the text of the enabling Treaty pays tribute to the 
role of EACJ judges to give a purposive interpretation for the fulfilment of the normative 
aims of the Treat tlu·ough article 6, 7 and 8. These ruiicles espouse an understanding of 
the underpilming ultimate rules of recognition inherent in international law and bring 
principles of justice into a forum dominated by state preferences. 
Employing the normative framework inherent in the Treaty, the Court has been able to 
respond to many a tyrannical government's violation of jus co gens norms as enumerated 
above. These range from violations of the right to liberty tlu·ough arbitrary arrests and 
detention incommunicado, violation of human dignity tlu·ough torture, cruel and inhuman 
treatment, violations of the right to life tlu·ough enforced disappearances of people and 
other such violations. Confounded by such claims of such blatant contraventions to 
obligatory norms by the states, the Court exhibited legitimacy in its use of judicial 
lawmaking to ensure that these state owed obligations towards their constituents and 
towards international law were met. 
The Anyang ' Nyong 'o decision manifested competing claims between principles of right-
process and state sovereignty. The Comi correctly upheld the principle of right process. 
The backlash upon the Court was hence, a false cue of the loss of legitimacy.248 The same 
246Paragraph 69 of the Democratic Alliance decision. ' The role of the Court in the instant Reference, was to 
ascertain the Partner States ' adherence to observance of, and/or compliance with the Treaty provisions -
including the provisions of any other international instruments which are incorporated in the Treaty, 
whether explicitly [as in Article 6(d)] , or implicitly [as in Article 7 (2)] ' Article 7(2) gives the Court wide 
leverage but this is more restricted compared to the wide leeway afforded to the ECCJ. 
247 Alter K, Gathii J and Helfer L, ' Backlash against international comts in West, East and Southern Africa: 
Causes and Consequences ' 20 16. 
248 J Gath ii, ' Mission creep or a search for relevance: the East African Court of Justice ' s human rights 
strategy ' 249-294.Uganda and Tanzania initially rejected Kenya ' s proposals to claw back the Court' s 
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could be said about the Democratic Society decision. At the time of compilation of this 
paper however, despite challenges to the Court' s legitimacy, only mere speculation could 
foreshadow the repercussions of the decision to the Court's legitimacy. However, such 
speculation would pose caution to the exercise of judicial lawmaking that fails to weigh 
compliance pulls of competing norms of international law. Unbridled judicial lawmaking 
is a sure way to threaten and lessen judicial legitimacy. 
authority. Kenya ' s attempt o delegitimize the Court by suspending some judges was rejected. However, its 
less damaging proposals were accepted. 
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IV. AN EVALUATION OF JUDICIAL LAWMAKING AND JUDICIAL 
LEGITIMACY IN THE SADC-T 
4.1 A brief history 
The suspended Southern Africa Development Community Tribunal (SADC- Tribunal) 
was properly constituted in 2003 by the SADC Council of Ministers in light of article 4 of 
the Protocol on Tribunal and Rules of Procedure.249 The Court had jmisdiction over 
matters that involved interpretation of the SADC- Treaty.250 Aliicle 15 describes the 
Scope of the Court's jmisdiction as limited to conflicts arising between States, and 
between Member States and States.251 There was no mention of a futme human rights 
jurisdiction of the Comi in the Protocol. 
This tribunal was only able to hear a few cases dming life-period.252 The SADC is 
currently suspended and information discussed spans the Court's exercise of its original 
mandate up ti112010. 
4.2 An analysis of the SADC- Tribunal's (SADC-T) jurisprudence 
The Mike Campbell case253 was among the first major cases that the Court heard. It 
involved Zimbabwe's redistribution land laws. The first applicant of European decent, 
owned land that the government of Zimbabwe sought to acquire for the purpose of 
redistribution of resources following decolonization. He approached the SADC-T for 
249 Southern Africa Legal Information Institute, accessed at http://www.saflii.org/content/sadc-tribunal-
decisions 
250 A1iicle 14 of the Protocol on the SADC Tribunal accessed at http://www.saflii.org/contentlsadc-tribunal-
decisions . Its main objective was to allow for economic integration among its Member States, which 
include Angola, Botswana, Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Lesotho, MadagaScar, Malawi, 
Mauritius, Mozambique, Namibia, Seychelles, South Africa, Swaziland, United Republic of Tanzania, 
Zambia and Zimbabwe. 
251 Article 15 of the Protocol to the SADC Tribunal. The text of the Protocol is constructed in a constricting 
manner, compared to the texts ofthe enabling texts of the EACJ and the ECCJ 
252 International Justice Resources Centre on the SADC accessed at http://www.ijrcenter.org/regional-
communities/southern-african-development-community-tribunall It is critical to note here as with the EACJ, 
majority of the cases concerned human rights issues .. 
253 Series of cases which include Mike Campbell (pvt) limited first applicant and William Michael Campbell 
second applicant v The republic of Zimbabwe respondent 2/07 (2007) SADCT I (13 December 2007), Nixon 
Chirinda and Others v Mike Campbell (Pvt) Limited and Others (09/08) [2008] SADCT I (17 September 
2008), the decision on merits in Mike Campbell (Pvt) Ltd and Others v Republic of Zimbabwe (2/2007) 
[2008] SADCT 2 (28 November 2008) and Fick and Another v Republic ofZimbab·we (SADC (T) 01/2010) 
[2010] SADCT 8 (16 July 2010). 
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different reasons. The first was to plead with the Court to issue a preliminary injunction 
to halt the acquisition scheme by the government of Zimbabwe. The second, was to ask 
the Court to find that the acquisition scheme was contrary to human rights as it was 
discriminatory and hence, a violation of provisions of the SADC Treaty. The Court 
granted both pleas. This was despite the government's attempt to prove that the Court 
lacked jurisdiction, as human rights violations were not matters within the Com1' s 
purview.254 To reach its highly controversial findings, the Court made three 
determinations. Two were substantive and one was procedural. 
4.2.1 The Court's substantive argument that it had jurisdiction to hear the 
matter regardless of the fact that it concerned human rights violations 
Much akin to the provision in the EAC Treaty, the State had argued that member states 
could only grant the Court a human rights jurisdiction by virtue of a Protocol. In reply to 
this, the Tribunal held that the Protocol mandated the Court to develop its own 
jurisprudence.255 Read together with at1icle 4(c) of the Treaty, which provided that 
Member States were to act in accordance with the principles of human rights, democracy 
and the rule of law, it meant that the Com1 could adjudicate on matters concerning human 
rights violations. 256 
4.2.2 A procedural ruling on exhaustion of local remedies 
254 Statement made in the case Mike Campbell (pvt) limited first applicant and William Michael Campbell 
second applicant v The republic of Zimbabwe respondent 2/07 (2007) SADCT 1(13 December 2007 ... 'The 
Respondent went on to argue that there are numerous Protocols under the Treaty but none of them is on 
human rights or agrarian reform, pointing out that there should first be a Protocol on human rights and 
agrarian reform in order to give effect to the principles set out in the Treaty. The Respondent further 
submitted that the Tribunal is required to interpret what has already been set out by the Member States and 
that, therefore, in the absence of such standards, against which actions of Member States can be measured.' 
255 Article 21(b) of the Protocol to the SADC Treaty on the creation of the SADC Tribunal mandated the 
Court to do so having regard to applicable treaties, general principles and rules of international law and any 
rules or principles ofthe law of States. 
256Mike Campbell (Pvt) Ltd and Others v Republic of Zimbabwe (2/2007) [2008] SADCT 2 (28 November 
2008) ' In deciding this issue, the Tribunal first referred to Article 21 (b) which, in addition to enjoining the 
Tribunal to develop its own jurisprudence, also instructs the Tribunal to do so 'having regard to applicable 
treaties, general principles and rules of public international law' which are sources of law for the Tribunal. 
That settles the question whether the . can look elsewhere to find answers where it appears that the Treaty is 
silent. In any event, we do not consider that there should first be a Protocol on human rights in order to give 
effect to the principles set out in the Treaty .... ' 
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The Court was expectedly confounded with the question on exhaustion of local remedies. 
The State claimed that the applicants had not exhausted all available local remedies as 
provided for in atiicle 15(2) of the Protocol. The Court agreed that exhaustion of local 
remedies was a vital element to be considered. However, it asse1ied itself in finding that 
the requirement need not be fulfilled in cases where the remedy was unavailable, 
ineffective or unduly prolonged.257 An examination of the judicial remedies offered in 
Zimbabwe in relation to the land redistribution scheme found them unavailable. This 
finding set precedent for later human rights cases; mandating the Court's prior 
examination ofthe availability and efficiency of judicial local remedies .258 
4.2.3 Applicable law in relation to human rights matters before it 
The SADC-T had in its decisions, employed human rights legislation that does not fall 
within the SADC body of laws. 259 This was most evident in the case of Barry Gonda v 
Zimbabwe.260 The applicants in this case were victims of violence occasioned upon them 
by agents of the respondent State. They sought remedies in the national comis in 
Zimbabwe and were awarded. However, the respondent State did not comply with the 
orders of the courts and the applicants were unable to enforce the judgment because 
section 5(2) of the State Liability Act prevented the execution of judgments on the State's 
property.261 The Tribunal found that section 5(2) was discriminatory in content under the 
International Convention on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR).262 The Court did not 
delimit the extent to which the ICCPR was used as either an interpretative instrument or a 
257 This was in affirmation of the law on exhaustion of local remedies, including its exceptions as set out in 
the case of Dawda Jawara v The Gambia in supranote 23 above. Unlike the rulings by the ECCJ and the 
EACJ, this particular decision served to harmonise, rather than fragment, international human rights law in 
the Continent as it affirmed judgments by the ACtHPR. See United Republic of Tanzania v Cimexplan 
(Mauritius) Ltd and Others (SADC (T) 01 /2009 (20 I 0) SADCT 5 (II June 20 I 0). 
258 Eborah S, 'Human rights developments in sub-regional courts in Africa during 2008' 9, African Human 
Rights Law Journal No I of 2009. He especially expressed fear for the absence of the requirement to 
exhaust local remedies by the ECCJ . He questions whether the approach used by the ECCJ could apply to 
proceedings before the African Commission, as it is a quasi-judicial body rather than an international court. 
Where such an approach is adopted, Mr Eborah notes that the threa~ of fragmentation of international 
human rights law in the contient would certainly be bigger. 
259 Michael Campbell and William Cambell cases quoted supranote 98 .also the Cimexplan case supranote 
I 03 , and the Barry Gonda case supranote I 06. The Tribunal used the Universal Declaration on Human 
Rights (UDHR), the JCCPR, and the Convention Against Torture (CAT) among other international treaties 
to find violations of human rights where applicable. 
260 Barry Gondo and 8 Others v The Republic of Zimbabwe SADC (T) 05/2008. 
261 Cap 8:14 
262 A1ticle 26 of the JCCPR. 
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treaty, whose breach, incurred a liability under the SADC regime.263Before its suspension, 
debates on the use of these treaties were rife. It has been argued that a lack of limitation 
on the applicable human rights instruments was a deliberate strategy of the Tribunal to 
strengthen its human rights mandate.264 
4.3 Analysis of the SADC jurisprudence 
The SADC-T represents a Tribunal, whose judicial lawmaking brought about a successful 
backlash: A true cue to the Court's waning legitimacy. The antagony evidenced in the 
SADC reveal the judicial sabotage occasioned by having judicial lawmaking untethered 
to the proposed normative hierarchy of rules. The degree of legitimacy exe1ied by the 
different norms varies considerably. Weighed against the principle of state sovereignty, 
its compliance pull is inadequate to tower that of state sovereignty. This lack of coherence 
exposed the Comi to attacks on its legitimacy, which were successfuJ.265 Had the Court 
restrained itself on the Mike Campbell case and pronounced itself more forcefully on the 
Barry Gonda case involving torture, the theory suggested propounds it would have been 
difficult for Zimbabwe to marshal support for a successful backlash against the Court. 
The principle of state sovereignty towered over the asserted human rights claim as the 
legitimacy of the antediluvian concept was much stronger than that of the emerging 
norm.266 This however could not be the only explanation. There is an emerging practice 
that is incongruent to previous understanding of the role of law in the international 
order.267 The role of law in an inherently chaotic political chasm has been to constrain 
political discretion: hence the birth of law from international relations. However, recent 
practice of states is to beget law that expands political discretion. The resolve taken by 
the SADC-T could be said to be evidence of such undertaking. The Comi's existence 
manifests the inherent antagony between concepts of international law before the advent 
of the principles of justice: which states seek to preserve and those that arise as a 
263 Adeyemi A, ' Bany Gonda and 8 Others v The Republic of Zimbabwe SADC (T) 05/2008 ' Southern 
Africa Development Community Legal Journal (2011) II 
164 Adeyemi A, 'Bany Gonda and 8 Others v The Republic of Zimbabwe, ' 20 II 
165 Zimbabwe's tactics yielded a much-divided Court with the Secretariat abandoning judicial push to 
sustain the Coutt. J Gathii, ' Mission creep or a search for relevance: the East Afl-ican Court of Justice 's 
human rights strategy ' · 
266 The propetty issue in this case was and still is an emotive issue in most Southern African countries. 
Eborah S, 'Human rights developments in sub-regional courts in Africa during 2008' 2009 
267 Sipalla H, ' The historical irreconcilability of international law and politics and its implications for 
international criminal justice in Africa. ' accessed at 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/cf dev/ AbsByAuth .cfm?per id=2593184 
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consequence of the principles of justice limiting state discretion, which states would 
advertently seek to overwrite. 
Essentially, the concept as developed in part II is illustrated by the relationship between 
judicial lawmaking and the judicial legitimacy of African sub-regional courts. 
International human rights matters have gradually confounded these Courts whose 
mandate was steeped in enabling regional economic integration efforts. It is their exercise 
of judicial lawmaking in expanding the procedural and substantive applicable law when 
adjudicating cases involving gross violations of human rights core norms that have 
preserved and enhanced their legitimacy. In cases where they have engaged in such 
lawmaking without respecting the differing compliance pull of the pre-existing hierarchy 
of norms, their legitimacy has been threatened. 
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V. COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS WITH THE ICJ AND THE PCA 
This section seeks to evaluate the veracity of the concept developed in part II and part II 
in relation to non-human rights international cowts (ICs). These two are the International 
Court of Justice (ICJ) and the Permanent Comt of Arbitration' s decision in the South 
China Sea dispute (Philippines v China) .268 This part seeks to establish that judicial 
lawmaking is also exercised in international cowts for the same purpose of preserving 
and enhancing their legitimacy, even when such comts are not mandated to interpret and 
apply human rights law. 
4.1 Judicial lawmaking and legitimacy in the International Court of Justice (ICJ) 
The ICJ is the principal judicial organ of the United Nations.269 The main purpose of the 
Court has been to subject state disputes to judicial resolution. A consequence of the 
devastating effects of a war that threatened the existence of humanity, the Comt is a 
testament to the subjugation of state authority by recognition of universal principles and 
norms underlying the international legal order. The Court has been immensely successful 
in adjudicating state disputes, consequently, achieving one of its normative aims. 
It's inherent design, however, reveals its most potent weaknesses. Its inability to evolve is 
consigned to the international legal antediluvian concepts of the state centeredness 
approach in international law. Similar to the other international comts, there exists an 
inherent antagony between established principles of international law centred on state 
sacrosanctity and emerging norms centred on the principles of justice due to the inclusion 
of individuals as subjects of the international legal order. The study looks into selected 
human rights cases that have revealed this i1mate antagony, the Comt's response and the 
resulting effect on the Court's legitimacy. The Comt reveals a certain trajectory in its 
adjudication of these matters. The initial history reveals a conservative Comt that leans to 
preserving state sovereignty principles through the concept of state consent. The latter 
period reveals a much bolder Court that recognises the existing normative hierarchy of 
268 The Republic of the Philippines v The Peoples' Republic of China PCA Case N° 2013-19. 
269 It was established in 1945 and began work in April 1946. It was a direct descendant of the Permanent 
International Court of Justice that came before the Second World War as a creation of the League of 
Nations. B. Simma, Human Rights and State Responsibility, in: A The Law of International Relations-Liber 
Amicorumfor Hanspeter Neuhold, Reinisch/ U. Kriebaum (eds.), 359 (2007). 
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norms underlying international law and justice and seamlessly integrates them m its 
adjudication. 
The first is the case of Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo.270 In this case, 
DRC brought a case against its neighbour Rwanda on atrocities committed against DRC's 
people as a result of the Great Lakes War (1980s-1990s). The claimant alleged violations 
of the Genocide convention by Rwanda but the court decided that it lacked jurisdiction 
based on the fact that Rwanda had excluded the legal effect of the Convention's 
compromissory clause by way of reservation, which the comi regarded, as validly made. 
The court further explained that even the peremptory nature of substantive obligations of 
the Genocide Convention could not compensate for or replace the lack of consent that 
was expressed by Rwanda's reservation, to have the court decide on the allegation of 
genocide. 
The obligation of states to prevent genocide constituted an erga omnes norm, meaning, 
norms that are agreed upon as non-transgressible by the community of nations and 
concerning the basic rights of the human person.271 Many commented that the Court's 
response, though unjust, served to preserve its legitimacy. However, separate opinions 
and dissenting expositions that were done revealed the extent to which the ICJ had 
exposed the Court to criticisms oflosing its legitimacy in the international legal sphere.272 
The second is the Arrest Warrants Case of Belgium v Congo.273 In this case, Belgium 
issued an arrest warrant against a former minister of the Congo for crimes against 
humanity, war crimes and other egregious crimes that were committed during his tenure 
in office. The Congo countered that Belgium had in doing so, breached its sovereignty 
and that the foreign minister still retained, under international law, immunity over acts 
270 Armed Activities on the Territo1y of the Congo (New Application : 2002) (Democratic Republic of the 
Congo v. Rwanda). 
271 B. Simma, Human Rights and State Responsibility, in: A. Reinisch/ U. Kriebaum (eds.), The Law of 
International Relations-Liber Amicorum for Hans peter Neuhold, 359 (2007). 
272 While this finding only followed its earlier jurisprudence the Cowt took the opp01tunity to explain that 
even the peremptory nature of substantive obligations of the Genocide Convention could not compensate 
for, or replace, the lack of consent, expressed by Rwanda's reservation, to have the Cowt decide on the 
allegation of genocide. Five members of the Court, among them myself, found this position unsatisfactory 
enough to write a joint Separate Opinion . 
273 Arrest Warrant of l I April 2000 (Democratic Republic of the Congo v. Belgium), Judgment, ICJ. Rep01ts 
2002, p. 3. 
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that were committed in official capacity. Belgium argued that such crimes were 
international criminal crimes, which denied their perpetrator immunity, regardless of his 
or her position. 
The case centred on the diplomatic rules of immunity: which exert a great compliance 
pull in the community of nations. There are two kinds of diplomatic immunities that this 
state official enjoyed. The first was diplomatic immunity as to functional immunity, 
(rationae materiae).274 The second was personal immunity (rationae personae).275 The 
ICJ resolved to the use of Customary International Law (CIL).276 The Court found that 
functional immunity only extends to acts that are done by state officials that aren't 
international crimes. However, the state official remains shielded by personal immunity, 
which is inviolable. Hence, it would not be possible to bring a state official to court 
during his tenure. The court lacked jurisdiction to hear such a matter. 
The Court's choice to employ ICL m the light of developing treaty practice by the 
international community to ensure punishment of perpetrators of such egregious 
violations of human rights norms was an act of extreme judicial restraint. Legitimacy of 
I 
the ICJ's decision was questioned.277 Bruno Simma encapsulates the zeitgeist when he 
writes that the Arrest Warrant case falls at a time when the court is struggling to retain 
balance between the classical view of state sovereignty and the growth of community 
norms among the nations. 278 
274 This immunity covers acts done in official capacity. These acts are state acts and not the individuals. 274 
Cassese A, ' When may senior state officials be tried for international crimes? Some comments on the 
Arrest Warrants Case accessed at http://ilmc.univie.ac.at/uploads/media/Cassese.pdf. 
275 This relates to acts done in personal capacity by the state official, though it is only extended to ce1tain 
class of officials. Personal immunity extends total inviolability and as a result, can be seen to protect the 
acts done by the state official completely. Cassese A, ' When may senior state officials be tried for 
international crimes? Some comments on the Arrest Warrants Case' accessed at 
http:// ilmc.univie.ac.at/uploads/media/Cassese.pdf. 
276 The law on immunities is not completely echoed in the VCL T. Cassese A, ' When may senior state 
officials be tried for international crimes? Some comments on the Arrest Warrants Case' accessed at 
http://ilmc.univie.ac.at/uploads/media/Cassese.pdf. 
277 This immunity covers acts done in official capacity. These acts are state acts and not the individuals. 277 
Cassese A, ' When may senior state officials be tried for international crimes? Some comments on the 
Arrest Warrants Case accessed at http:// ilmc.univie.ac.at/uploads/media/Cassese.pdf and Simma 8 , ' Human 
rights before the International Court of Justice: Community interest coming to life' accessed at 
http://www.oxfordscholarship.com/view/ l 0.1 093/acprof:oso/9780 199653218.001.000 1/acprof-
9780 199653218-chapter-13. 
278 Simma 8 , 'Human rights before the International Court of Justice: Community interest coming to life' 
accessed at http://www .oxfordscholarship.com/view/ I 0. I 093/acprof:oso/9780 I 99653218.00 I .0001 /acprof-
9780 1996532 I 8-chapter-13. 
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The Court's most progressive declaration came with the Belgium v Senegal case that 
concerned the prosecution of war crimes and crimes against humanity committed by 
Hissene Habre of Chad. This was what Bruno Simma named, a pure human rights 
case.).279 Belgium requested Senegal to either convict or extradite the former dictator, 
Hissene: evidencing the principle of et dedere at judiciare .280 The court decided this on 
pure human rights stance, and ordered Senegal to prosecute which it began doing in the 
year 2015 under the Extraordinary Chamber of the African Comi in Dakar Senegal_281 
The level of support for the seemingly judicially unfounded decision that came 
outpouring from the international community was illustrative of the strong compliance 
pull to honour the existing normative obligations. 
Analysis on the ICJ's jurisprudence 
The difference underlying the Court's conceptions were driven by an appreciation of the 
increasing strong compliance pulls of general norms of international law that were 
incorporated through the inclusion of justice in the framework for evaluation of 
legitimacy of international rule-interpreting institutions. The cases concerning gross 
violations of jus cogens norms that were not met with a certain level of judicial 
lawmaking to ensure state adherence to their obligatio erga omnes revealed an underlying 
weakness in the Court's procedural and substantial rules. Consider the responses to the 
An·est Warrants Case and the Aimed Activities case. The inconigibility of the Comt: 
illustrated by its inability to engage in judicial lawmaking lessened its legitimacy in the 
eyes of evaluating constituents. In contrast, the response to the decision of the Comt in 
the Belgium v Senegal case represents the recognised compliance pull of these general 
norms and principles and the unwritten ultimate obligation of states to adhere to them. 
279 Simma B, ' Human rights before the International Court of Justice: Community interest coming to life' 
accessed at http: //www.oxfordscholarship.com/view/I 0.1 093/acprof:oso/9780 199653218.001.000 1/acprof-
9780 199653218-chapter-13 It met the double pronged standard in that, it was neither a 
Nebenkriegsschauplatz, (meaning concerned with ongoing hostilities between the two states), and neither 
was it a case that concerned the right of diplomatic protection of states. 
280 Belgium was relying on the passive personality principle. Simma B, ' Human rights before the 
International Court of Justice: Community interest coming to life' https://www.hrw.org/blog-feed/trial-
h issene-habre 
281 https:/ /www .hrw. org/b log-feed/trial-h issene-habre 
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The ICJ, an inherently international court, purely for state disputes, serves as perhaps the 
best illustration of the existence of normative rules in international law. The merge of the 
principles of justice with the old principles governing international law is manifested in 
the ICJ's ruling in Belgium v Senegal and that of Ahamdou Diallo282 • Its decision in the 
Nuclear Weapons283 case is also illustrative. Justice has developed into a core element of 
adjudging the legitimacy of not only international rules, but also international rule-
interpreting institutions. This, the international community, owes to the rise of 
international human rights core obligatory norms. 
4.2 The effect of judicial lawmaking in the South China Sea dispute heard by 
IT LOS 
A study of a recent decision of the PCA is necessary to illustrate a conflict between 
international legal principles and norms and consequently, evidence an existing hierarchy 
of norms to which states and rule-interpreting institutions are bound to. The dispute 
herein does not manifest a human rights issue. However, it is elucidative of a pre-existing 
nonnative hierarchy of rules in the international legal order. The outcome of the decision 
illush·ates that an institution's work, when compounded by such antagonistic principles, is 
to choose among them, the one exerting the most compliance pull and give fulfilment to it. 
In the absence of this, the PCA's enforcement of a less-compliance exerting norm, would 
undoubtedly lead to the loss of legitimacy of the decision it seeks to muster compliance 
for. 
The South China Sea dispute involves several states in East Asia. 284 Among them are the 
Philippines and China. The dispute, as had been explained, concerns maritime boundary 
issues and territorial sovereignty disagreements among the states in the South. China Sea. 
China's main argument was that the PCA lacked the jurisdiction to hear the matter as it 
pertained an issue that it lacked the authority to determine.285 Furthermore, China opted 
out of the compulsory arbitration clause for disputes concerning the interpretation or 
282 Republic of Guinea v. Democratic Republic of the Congo),. Merits, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2010, p. 
639. 
283 Legality of the threat or use of nuclear weapons (ICJ) Advisory opinion 1996 
284 The rest include but are not limited to: Vietnam, Taiwan, Malaysia, Indonesia, and Brunei 
285Talmon S, ' The South China Sea arbitration: Is there a case to answer?' and Stefan Talmon interview on 
https: //www.youtube.com/watch?v=sSQXNpXWhpw. 
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application of certain treaty provisions.286 In order to circumnavigate the limits placed 
upon the PCA, it chose to view, what was essentially was a territorial sovereignty dispute 
between the Philippines and China as one about ocean rights.287 
The PCA' s lengthy decision attempts to rationalise its refusal to acknowledge the 
relevance or legitimacy of China's historical claims that predate UNCLOS. The tribunal 
concluded that, to the extent China had any historic rights to resources in the waters of the 
South China Sea, such rights were extinguished if incompatible with the exclusive 
economic zones provided for in UNCLOS. This decision has been criticised heavily for 
its refusal to recognise China's pre-existing historical rights to resources in the South 
China Sea by applying UNCLOS retroactively to delegitimize China's claims.288 The 
spokesperson for the UN Secretary General refused to endorse the findings of the PCA in 
its application of the Treaty before it.289 Despite a conflation of possible issues that could 
have led to the lack of a compliance-pull by the PCA's decisions, this paper proposes that 
the issue was hinged on the recognition of conflicting rules of international law and 
enforcement of the mgst compliance exe1iing of those. These rules were the principle of 
state sovereignty and UNCLOS rules on Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZs). 
Analysis of the decision 
The enforcement of the rule on UNCLOS negotiated rules on EEZs over the principle of 
sovereignty of states is to be examined in line with the framework proposed in Part II. 
The rules prescribed by UNCLOS constitute primary norms of obligations. In contrast, 
the principle of state sovereignty constitutes secondary rule of recognition. The 
framework propounded suggests that the compliance pull exe1ied by the secondary rules 
of recognition is much stronger than that exerted by the UNCLOS rule on EEZs. Rules 
existing, as pnmary rules of obligations require consent to exert compliance. 
286 China opted out of " relating to sea boundary delimitations, or those involving historic bays or titles 
A1ticle 298, UNCLOS. 
287 Klein J, ' South China Sea: UN Law of the Sea Tribunal sinks the rule of law' Foreign Policy Journal, 
2016. 
288 Chanock A, 'An Analysis of China's Legal Position and its Implications in the South China Sea' I, 
Journal of Lcrw, Technology and Public Policy, 20 I 5. 
289 AI Jazeera and agencies, 'No legal basis' for China's South China Sea claims ' AI Jazeera, I3 July 20I6 
http://www.aliazeera.com/news/20 16/07 /historic-title-china-south-china-sea-court- I 607 I 2090955493 .html 
on I I January 20 I 7. 
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Consequently, China's decision to opt out of the compulsory dispute resolution clause of 
UNCLOS as regards specific matters ought to have been respected by the Comi. The opt-
out clause derives from the principle of state consent, which is derived from the principle 
of state sovereignty. The Court, inadvertently chose to enforce the rules on the EEZ that 
were borne out of consent of states without pmiicular recognition of an underlying 
ultimate rule that exerted greater compliance. The attempt of the Comi to enforce the 
primary rule over the underlying principle denied the derived rule its legitimacy and 
threatened the legitimacy of the institution as evidenced from the rebuffs occasioned upon 
the Court. 
This reveals that there exists, as propounded in chapter 2, an existing hierarchy of norms. 
A Court seeking to preserve its legitimacy is to rely on the enforcement of norms that 
exert greater compliance pulls: those that validate lower level rules, over those that don't. 
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VI. CONCLUSION 
5.1 Summary of Chapters 
5.1.1 Part 1 
Chapter 1 set out the legal question that the paper would inquire into. This was whether 
exercise of judicial legitimacy by sub-regional international courts in adjudicating human 
rights matters affected their legitimacy. 
5.1.2 Part 2 
Chapter 2 gave an expository analysis of the concepts of legitimacy in order to lay a 
conceptual framework that would guide in evaluating whether judicial lawmaking 
affected judicial legitimacy. It is found that the concept of legitimacy in international law 
is not steeped in the concept of state consent as previously conceived. Normative 
legitimacy is to be found in an evaluation of adherence to a pre-existing hierarchy of 
norms. The least of these norms manifest as primary norms of obligation. Primary rules 
of obligation are validated by secondary rules of recognition. These detail how rules are 
to be interpreted and applied rather than the rules themselves. These are essentially, rules 
about rules. The last in the hierarchy are the ultimate rules of recognition, which validate 
both primary norms, and secondary rules. From them, there is no further validation. 
A coherent skein of validation of rules endows a rule with legitimacy and legitimizes the 
rule-interpreting institution, which adheres to this. Pre-existing human rights core 
obligatory norms, termed jus cogens norms exert compliance pulls on international courts 
that may not be mandated to hear human rights cases as they form pmi of the unwritten 
body of secondary and ultimate rules of recognition. Consequently, an international court 
exercising its judicial lawmaking to enable it to hear human rights matters that constitute 
violations of these jus cogens norms is adhering to a legitimate end and hence, the act 
preserves and enhances its legitimacy. Essentially, judicial lawmaking, when exercised in 
these parameters preserves and enhances a comi's legitimacy. 
5.1.3 Part 3 
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Chapter 3 evaluates tests out the concept formulated in Chapter II to see the effect of 
judicial lawmaking in sub-regional African courts: EACJ, the ECCJ and the now defunct 
SADC-T. It is found that the concept is coherent and applies to explain why some 
backlashes were successful while others were not. 
5.1.4 Part 4 
Part 4 evaluates this concept with regard to the ICJ's rare exercise of judicial lawmaking 
when confounded by human rights matters. It is found that the concept is coherent and 
explicative of the surges in ICJ legitimacy that have been observed over time. 
5.1.5 Part 5 
Pa11 5 lays down the conclusion and the conceptual recommendation. 
5.2 Theoretical recommendation 
The exerc1se of judicial lawmaking indeed blurs the margms between the legislative 
bodies and the judicial bodies. The castigations, of many a scholar are not unfounded. 
There is tlu-eat to the legitimacy of institutions, if they fail to adhere to the functions that 
they were set up for. However, judicial lawmaking is necessary in certain instances to 
preserve and enhance the judicial legitimacy of international courts. This paper lays down 
a framework for identification of situations in which judicial lawmaking would enhance 
legitimacy. The first is whether the matter involves allegations of violations of core 
human rights obligator norms. If so, judicial lawmaking exercised to improve the 
procedural and substantive rules of the rule-interpreting institution will translate into 
preserving or enhancing legitimacy. Where the IC ignores such issues its legitimacy is 
tlu·eatened. Where the matters do not involve violations of core human rights obligatory 
norms, any fmm of judicial lawmaking would likely lessen the comi's legitimacy, as it 
would be espied to exercise authority that isn't its own. 
Thomas Franck ends his book with an appeal to the study of justice and its role in the 
international legal order, following the advent of international human rights law. The aim 
53 
of this paper has been to study the change that justice occasioned onto the international 
legal order. The streams of justice and legitimacy, which Franck once identified as 
different, are now mixed and the waters run in the same channel. The advent of 
international human rights law does not only bring a realisation of more underlying 
international norms and principles, but essentially elevates the individual to a subject of 
international law. This endows the international legal order with principles of justice to 
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